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OF AGE AND THE CONSTITUTION
HOWARD EGLIT*

Ours, like all cultures, is a society in which age distinctions are
widely employed as mechanisms of social control.' Decisions regarding the allocation of public resources, the extension and denial of public benefits, the imposition of legal disadvantages and the relaxation of
legal responsibilities are commonly based on the 2age of the individual
who is at the target end of these determinations.
Many age distinctions ensconced in laws and regulations are no
doubt the product of happenstance, rather than careful plan or analysis. 3 Nonetheless, given their prevalence in our statutes, given their
* Associate Professor of Law, lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law; J.D., University of Chicago. An article commenting upon this article, written by Professor Martin Lyon Levine, appears
at page 1081 infra.
1. American society is hardly unique. Age as a determinant of status and of the rights and
responsibilities attendant thereon is common in all cultures. See, e.g., 3 M. RILEY, M. JOHNSON &
A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY 402 (1972).
2. See generally Cain, The Growing Importanceof LegalAge in Determiningthe Status of the
Elderly, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 167 (1974).
Examples, of course, are abundant. Definitions of crime and imposition of imprisonment can
turn on the perpetrator's age. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § II-l(a) (1979). Welfare and
social insurance programs key to age, as do a variety of other federal programs. See HOUSE
SELECT COMM. ON AGING, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ELDERLY, COMM. PUB. No. 95-167,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1979). Some states set maximum age requirements for hiring
new police officers and fire fighters. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-2.1-14 (1979) (police
officers, 36 years; fire fighters, 35 years). Publicly supported schools exclude those too young, e.g.,
Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (D. Me. 1975) (exclusion of 3-year-old from kindergarten),
and have barred those supposedly too old. Eg., Purdie v. University of Utah, 584 P.2d 831 (Utah
1978) (rejection of 51-year-old from post-graduate program). See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY 76 (1977) (a number of medical schools in the past excluded applicants over ages 30 or 35). Zoning laws may exclude children from communities,
creating exclusive precincts for the middle-aged and the elderly. See Doyle, Retirement Communities.- The Natureand Enforceabiliy ofResidentialSegregationby Age, 76 MICH. L. REV. 64 (1977).
Less overt, but equally significant decisions are made on the basis of age in other settings.
Hospital emergency room services are denied the aged in favor of younger patients when medical
personnel and supplies are scarce. See Sudnow, Dead on Arrival, in SOCIOLOGICAL REALITIES
225, 227 (I. Horowitz & M. Strong eds. 1971). Public mass transit systems operate buses whose
steps are too high for the mobility impaired-who are often elderly--to mount, and subways
whose lack of elevators or escalators likewise bar their use by such persons. See U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., TRAVEL BARRIERS (1970). See also Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
Cir. 1977). Children are punished for acts--school truancy, for example-which if perpetrated by
adults would carry no condemnation. Federally financed programs designed for the general population disproportionately underserve the elderly. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AGE DisCRIMINATION STUDY 10-21 (1977). The mass media typically portray the elderly in negative roles
and negative terms. See generally J. TEBBEL, AGING IN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MASS
MEDIA (NCOA Monograph No. 2, 1976).
3. A classic example of the unreflective ways in which age distinctions are injected into our
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permeation of our general social attitudes, and given their persistence,
age criteria must be satisfying certain social and political needs. Some
of these needs are obvious, even if not often articulated. For one, reliance upon age categorizations facilitates decisionmaking. Rather than
a program administrator having to engage in the time-consuming and
costly exercise of determining whether a given individual does or does
not fit into a programmatic charter, he can rely upon a clear, indisputable fact-the age of the person involved. In a society such as ours,
heavily larded with bureaucratically administered programs extending
benefits and entitlements, the accompanying dollar and time savings
can be enormous.
Not only do the bureaucrats gain; there are advantages for the individual as well. Certainly, use of age distinctions enables speedier decisions than would individualized treatment. There are even some
gains in fairness which likely accrue from employing age criteria, for
statutes is provided by the recollections of Wilbur Cohen, one of the chief legislative aides involved in the drafting of the landmark Social Security Act of 1935. Cohen has written:
The simple fact is that at no time in 1934 did the staff or members of the Committee on
Economic Security deem feasible any other age than 65 as the eligible age for the receipt
of old age insurance benefits. There is, therefore, very little material available to analyze
the economic, social, gerontological, or other reasons for the selection of this particular
age. . . . The committee made no detailed studies of alternative ages or of any proposals for voluntary retirement at earlier ages or of compulsory retirement or of any flexible
retirement program in relation to the disability of an individual.
• . . It was understood that a reduction in the age below 65 would substantially
increase costs and, therefore, might impair the possibility of successful acceptance of the
plan by Congress. A higher retirement age, of say 68 or 70, was never considered because of the belief that public and congressional opposition would develop against such a
provision in view of the widespread unemployment that existed.
W. COHEN, RETIREMENT POLICIES UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 17-18 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
See also Withers, Some IrrationalBeliefs About Retirement in the United States, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 23, 24 (Winter 1974).
Age 65 as a significant touchstone had apparently first risen to the level of government consciousness in the late 19th century, in Bismarck's Germany, when the first national social welfare
program was devised and that age was utilized. The Social Security Act's adoption of that age
line, little analyzed as it was, succeeded in making age 65 a demarcation of considerable significance throughout our society:
The age of 65 has more or less come to be considered as the age of entering old age
in American society. It seems likely that the Social Security Act of 1935 did more to
define this limit than any other single event. Probably most private pension schemes
adopted or proposed since that date have taken the age of 65 as the date of retirement.
Compulsory retirement requirements have become much more frequent since 1935, and
they often adopted 65 years as the age of effectuation. . . . Thus a legal definition
helped to differentiate more sharply a social category.
Rose, The Subculture of the Aging: A Topicfor SociologicalResearch, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING 29, 32 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968).
A move away from the critical significance of age 65 has gained momentum in recent years.
In 1978 Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to extend its
hitherto limited coverage only of persons 40-65 to include individuals up to age 70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §631 (Supp. III 1979)).
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use of the unarguable factor of age mitigates the potential for discretionary injustice which is inherent when a bureaucratic system is called
upon to render judgments in a context which leaves room for subjective
evaluation. Added to these advantages for the individual are the likely
benefits which follow for society as a whole from an age-reliant system:
so long as a system works the same for all people by unswervingly using the objective factor of age as the basis for decisionmaking, the appearance of justice is generated and maintained-a not inconsiderable
plus in a society increasingly suspicious of government.
Age lines adopted in statutes and regulations also serve to translate
social attitudes into legal norms, thereby presumably satisfying more
intangible, but nonetheless real, societal needs. Delineation of groups
by their ages serves to facilitate the expression of certain felt perceptions about those groups: the notion that children may, and should,
properly be subjected to both social protections and controls because
they are physically, emotionally and intellectually immature; the perception on the one hand that older people have had their day in the sun
and thus may properly be moved out of the way, and on the other hand
that the aged are deserving of society's helping hand; the belief that
adults in the youthful and middle-aged ranges should not be dependent, but rather should shoulder their responsibilities without special
government aid.
There are, of course, very significant arguments that go in the
other direction, identifying ageism 4 as a significant, sometimes even intolerable, vice. The use of age lines serves to facilitate stereotyping,
which leads to the treating of people in ways which ignore their individual capacities and merit; to label someone as "old" or "young" is to
be able to set him at arm's length, which in turn eases mistreatment: he
is not one of "us," he is one of "them."5 Age distinctions thus undermine basic social concepts of equality and individual worth. And what
makes ageism particularly bad is that, like racism and sexism, it segre4. Throughout this article "ageism" will be used to denote the use of age-based distinctions
and perceptions to impose negative consequences upon the target of such distinctions and perceptions. Some ascribe the coining of the term to Dr. Robert Butler. See, e.g., R. BUTLER, WHY
however, to prejudice and stereSURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 11 (1975). He confined it,
otyping directed against the old. This article views ageism in broader perspective, deeming the
term applicable in all contexts-with reference to the young as well as the elderly.
5. Numerous studies suggest that society in general stereotypes aging and the aged with
negative evaluations. The stereotype reflects the expectation that old age is a time characterized by a decreasingly active role in life, economic insecurity, loneliness, resistance
to change, poor health, and failing mental and physical powers. In short, old age is not
seen as conducive to feelings of adequacy, adjustment, usefulness, and security.
Peters, Self-Conceptions of the Aged, Age Ident#Fcation,and Aging, II GERONTOLOGIST 69, 72-73
(Pt. II, Winter 1971) (citations omitted).
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gates the individual on the basis of a characteristic which he himself
has not chosen, and which he has no power to change. This flies in the
face of fundamental societal values: "[l]egal burdens," the Supreme
Court has said, "should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 6 Inevitably, then, unfairness works hand-inglove with age distinctions: some who are otherwise qualified will be
denied, some who are otherwise deserving will be rejected, because an
age-geared system of social ordering leaves no room to consider individual abilities and needs.
Ageism takes more tangible tolls as well. Age-based mandatory
retirement, for example, deprives society of the productivity of still able
and willing workers. 7 Not only do they no longer contribute goods and
services; they become consumers of governmental assistance and users
of entitlements, such as Social Security, which they might otherwise not
have to turn to. 8 Indiscriminate age lines may also generate other costs
which a more finely tuned system could avert: reduced mass transit
fares, for example, are made available to persons over 60, whether or
not they are actually needy. 9 Thereby a benefit extended because of a
perception of financial need is perverted by reliance upon a criterionage-which is not necessarily a good predictor of economic distress.
6. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
7. One estimate is that in 1972, the mandatory retirement of older workers accounted for a
loss of about 0.3% of the total gross national product---e., $3.4 billion. Given the vast growth in
the GNP, the total dollars lost is now much higher, even assuming that the percentage rate has not
also increased. See Schulz, The Economics of Mandatory Retirement, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 1,
7-8 (Winter 1974).
8. The increasing burden of Social Security payments for workers has been a matter of
growing public attention and concern. The costs of the Social Security system, maintained by a
regressive tax, are rising at a rate in excess of salaries. This is due to the twin burdens of inflation,
to which Social Security benefits are now geared, and the allegedly progressively deteriorating
dependency ratio, which measures the number of unemployed relying upon those who are still in
the work force.
Actually, the figures are not as distressing as they are sometimes portrayed to be. The rising
costs of benefits to the retired are mitigated to some degree by the decreasing costs of child rearing, given reduced birthrates. Whether workers psychologically perceive the two types of costs as
equivalent and therefore can regard the shift in dependents from youngsters to oldsters as essentially a wash is problematic, however. See P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 49 (1976).
Moreover, an increasing number of early retirees skew the dependency ratio by injecting into
dependent status a larger than otherwise expectable number of older individuals. See Economics
of Aging. Toward a Full Share in Abundance, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and
Retirement Income of the Senate Special Commt on Aging, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 9 app. A,
Employment Aspects of the Economics of Aging 1307, 1316-17 (1970). See generally U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-23, No. 59, DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF
AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1976); J. SCHULZ, THE ECONOMICS

OF AGING 6-8 (1976).
9. Reduced fares are required to be extended by recipients of federal financial assistance
under the Urban Mass Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1604(m) (1976). Similarly, Amtrak is required to
provide reduced fares for seniors. Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979, 45 U.S.C. § 545(c) (Supp.
III 1979).
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Even granting that age distinctions are common throughout all so-

cieties,' 0 it does not follow that customs and mores of past days and of
simpler cultures are appropriate in our society today. I And whatever
one's conclusions about the benefits and detriments of age categorization, the day when we could simply accept our age-infused social system in a matter-of-fact manner is behind us. Political and social

sensitivities have been triggered both by increasingly aggressive interest
groups, most significantly those representing seniors,' 2 and by the superficial similarities between the readily identified evils of racism and
sexism, on the one hand, and ageism on the other. As a consequence,
legislatures and judges have had to begin to come to grips with the

3
phenomenon of ageism.'

The purpose of this article is to explore the treatment by the courts
of age distinctions under the Constitution. The temptation in articlesof this nature is to offer the answer--the solution which, if only legisla10. See note I supra.
11. It has been observed as to the old that:
In essence, our culture is -presently creating a new life-era-a new phase of considerable
duration in the life cycle-but, as yet, has not developed any major institutions that can
give purpose and meaning to life in these extended 20 or 30 years. In many simpler
cultures, the old are the about-to-die. It seems that something of this code still lingers,
atavistically, with us, despite the fact that our so-called "dying" people may go on living
far beyond the formally defined onset of such a status.
Clark, The Anthropology ofAging A New Areafor Studies of Culture and Personality,in MIDDLE
AGE AND AGING

433, 438 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968).

The roles of the young are likewise changing, and subject to further change in light of developments in our society. Adolescence, or extended youth, has been extended through the middle
20s for many persons, given their need to continue attending professional schools during those
years. See generaly K. KENISTON, YOUTH AND DISSENT (1971). Perhaps, then, raising the age of
legal adulthood ought to be contemplated rather than-as evidenced by the twenty-sixth amendment's lowering of the voting age to 18-decreasing it. Contrarily, given technological advances,
there is warrant for abolishing at least some of the impositions which traditionally have accompanied childhood status. For example, the day of the computer operated automobile may be fairly
near. Will it still make sense to condition drivers' licensure on attainment of age 16, as most states
do, given the fact that it could be the computer that drives the car, rather than the person behind
the steering wheel? Or, should mandatory schooling requirements be relaxed, given the fact that
portable pocket calculators can do all the mathematical computations one once had to learn in the
schoolroom by memorization of multiplication tables, etc.?
12. As to the political activism of seniors' groups generally, see H. PRATT, THE GRAY LOBBY
(1976).
13. The most common focus in the legal literature insofar as age-related discrimination is
concerned is the practice of mandatory retirement. A number of reasoned disapprobations have
been set forth. See Note, MandatoryRetirement-A Vehiclefor Age Discrimination,51 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 116 (1974); Note, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 748 (1975). The problem with most of these efforts is that the authors, while
deploring ageism in the employment context, fail to take cognizance of the fact that ageism is
rampant. In the field of employment itself, for example, child labor laws restrict youngsters.
Other laws have an impact upon young adults. See note 2 supra. Generally, the articles do not
acknowledge the potential consequences of their arguments; they do not address the possibility
that to damn age discrimination against the old may ineluctably lead to condemnation of all uses
of age distinctions, no matter where in the age continuum the victim stands.
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tors and judges had the wisdom of the author-would satisfy all
problems. Some suggestions will be made, since the temptation is too
great to resist, and in any event, the conventions of the genre call for
such. By no means, however, is this article presented as the final word
by this author on the complexities of ageism in America. It will succeed enough if it at least serves as a vehicle for generating heightened
realization of the prevalence of age distinctions in our society, and for
enhancing sensitivity to the gains and losses which follow from the phenomenon.
One preliminary caveat is in order. This article is primarily directed to discrimination claims made by adults, or by individuals close
to the age of majority who contend that their incipient adulthood is
imminent enough to warrant accelerated entrance into adult status.
Nonetheless, a coherent analysis of age distinctions and their constitutional status should take into account the obvious: all of us, children
and adults, are possessed of age. It may not be possible to devise a
formula whereby ageism can be encompassed within a perfect unified
schemata, given the fact that there are in real and perceptible terms
significant differences between children and adults. But if that seamless theory is unattainable, at the least, the segregation of youngsters
from adults for purposes of discussing ageism must be justifiable and
justified.
AGE LINES IN THE CONSTITUTION

The United States Constitution explicitly addresses age distinctions at only a few junctures. This sparsity of reference need not occasion particular comment, however; the language of the Constitution is
for the most part that of grand generalities.
In four instances the Constitution sets age qualifications for the
holding of public office: the President must be at least 35,14 as must be
the Vice-President as well; 15 senators must have attained age 30;16 and
age 25 is the minimum required for representatives.1 7 The debates of
the drafters reveal that little attention was paid to the setting of these
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
15. The twelfth amendment specifies that:
[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of
Vice-President ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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age lines; only the age 25 standard occasioned any comment at all. 18
One can momentarily speculate as to the drafters' concern with federal
elected officials not being too young. Few people lived to see their 60s
and 70s in eighteenth century America; thus the problem of superannuated presidents and legislators likely did not loom as a significant realistic problem. Moreover, older people were accorded a certain degree
of veneration; old age was not regarded as a basis for scorn or condescension. 19
Article III of the Constitution embodies an implicit rejection of
age distinctions by virtue of its guaranteeing life tenure to federal
judges, an obvious barrier to mandatory retirement for the federal judiciary. 20 Here, of course, a primary concern of the drafters was to assure
the independence of these officials by insulating them from the pressures of running for office and of risking job loss as a result of public
displeasure with their decisions.
Shortly after the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was
adopted, designed to secure for the newly freed slaves the rights they so
long had been denied. Section 2 of the amendment authorizes the reduction of a state's representation in the Congress in the event the right
to vote of any male 21 years old is abridged. This was of course intended as a disincentive to the southern states' impairing the franchise
of blacks. The use of age 21 occasioned no particular thought; that was
the universally accepted age of majority and so was naturally em21
ployed.
In 1971 the Constitution was amended by the addition of the
twenty-sixth amendment, which bars both the federal government and
the states from setting a voting age higher than 18.22 Clearly this
18. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375 (M. Farrand rev. ed.
1966) (Madison's notes).
19. See generally D. FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 26-76 (exp. ed. 1978).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § i. Congress has provided that chief judges of federal district
courts and federal courts of appeals may not exceed age 70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 136(a) (1976).
They may of course continue serving as judges, however. For a considerable period of time the
American Bar Association has played an informal role in approving selections for the federal
judiciary; only recently the ABA abolished the rule which it had employed whereby it would not
give its imprimatur to nominees for initial appointment who were over the age of 64. See Legal
Times of Wash., Dec. 22, 1980, at 28.
21. See note 160 infra.
22. Congress had earlier attempted to achieve this end by statute. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), a majority of the Court upheld the legislation insofar as it regulated national
elections, but it struck down the federal effort to reach exercise of the franchise in state elections.
Id at 117-18. The Court never questioned that some age line could be drawn; the issue before it
was one of power: did the federal legislature have the authority to set age standards for state
elections? The Court answered in the negative, and the adoption of the twenty-sixth amendment
quickly followed.
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amendment for the first time expresses in the body of the Constitution a
sensitivity to ageism. The argument that if young men 18 to 21 were
old enough to die in Vietnam they were old enough to participate in
their country's political processes was a compelling and winning one.
Direct challenges to these age limits set by the Constitution have
not been made. Nor are these particular constitutional provisions at
the core of the concerns generated about perceived age discrimination.
Rather, it is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
which generally has served as the fulcrum for constitutional attacks on
ageism. On occasion, the amendment's due process clause also has
been relied upon as a basis for mounting challenges to age distinctions.
And in the particular context of jury selection, the sixth amendment,
which has been incorporated through the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause so as to be applicable to the states,23 has served as a
source of constitutionally based argumentation.
Because the jury selection case law is a discrete and confined body
of judicial treatment, it can be addressed relatively quickly before turning to the broader-ranging reach of the due process and equal protection provisions.
JURY SELECTION AND AGEISM

Underrepresentation of both the young and the old as jurors is a
24
common feature of both federal and state petit and grand juries.
There are several causes. Many statutes set explicit age minima for the
jury venire; 25 some also set maxima. 26 Sometimes informal selection
practices operate in an exclusionary manner, even without any statutory basis. 27 Often, the elderly are by statute or practice allowed to
28
voluntarily excuse themselves from jury service.
23. The first eight amendments to the Constitution only apply to actions of the federal government. The fourteenth amendment speaks directly to the states, and to the governmental entities subordinate to them---counties, cities, etc. By means of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, most of the guarantees of the first eight amendments have been incorporated
through that clause and made applicable to the states. See generaly G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 492 n.* (10th ed. 1980).
24. See generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 35, 331 app. H (1977) [hereinafter cited as VAN DYKE]; Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76

MICH. L. REV. 1045 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zeigler].
25. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1976) (age 18 for petit and grand juries); CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 198 (West Supp. 1981) (age 18); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (age 18 for petit juries).
26. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (age 75 maximum). See also
VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 258 app. A.
27. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611, 614 n.3 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).

28. See VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 123-24.
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Other ostensibly age-neutral devices have age-related impacts.
Students are often allowed to excuse themselves, 29 as are mothers with
small children; 30 in both instances the consequence is to remove from
the jury pool people at the low end of the age spectrum. Voter registration lists are often used for the preparation of the jury venire. 3 1 Since
as a group the young do not register in as great a degree as do older

citizens, 32 reliance upon such lists leads to low numbers of the young in
the venire. Moreover, delays in updating jury lists have the consequence of excluding the newly registered 18-year-olds whose names do
appear on the voter rolls.33 Indeed, delays in excess of three years have
been tolerated, thus resulting in the exclusion of young men and women 18 through 20 or 21, all of whom had registered since the last
34
updating.
Two arguments relevant to age-based exclusions have been addressed by the courts. The first is that age lines in and of themselves
are unconstitutional. As to this approach, the courts have usually been
hostile whenever the claimants are young. 35 The case law as to the old
is meager, but a little more positive. 36 But as to both groups, judicial
exploration of the issues has been particularly absent-blunt assertions
have been the norm. 37 Thus, for example, in King v. Leach3 8 the court
simply stated, "Advanced age alone is not ground for disqualification
29. See People v. Attica Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 492, 495-96, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (Sup. Ct.
1974); People v. Marr, 67 Misc. 2d 113, 115, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Just. Ct. 1971).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 595 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Eskew, 460 F.2d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 1972).
31. See Note, The Constitutionality o/Excluding Young Peoplefram Jury Service, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 131, 133 & n.9 (1972).
32. Zeigler, supra note 24, at 1046 n.8.
33. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 135-38 (1974); United States v. Smith,
523 F.2d 771, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138 (1974); United States v. Kirk, 534
F.2d 1262, 1278 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d
1243, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Owen, 492 F.2d 1100, 1109 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965
(1974); United States v. Osborne, 482 F.2d 1354, 1355 (8th Cir. 1973); Hurley v. State, 335 So. 2d
183, 187 (Ala. App. 1976); People v. Hoiland, 22 Cal. App. 3d 530, 540, 99 Cal. Rptr. 523, 529
(1971). Contra, State v. Willis, 33 Ohio Misc. 159, 160, 293 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Akron Mun. Ct.
1972); State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 473, 168 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1969).
36. See, e.g., King v. Leach, 131 F.2d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1942); Trotter v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 838,
377 S.W.2d 14, 25, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 890 (1964). But see United States v. Armsbury, 408 F.
Supp. 1130, 1137 n.5 (D. Or. 1976); People v. Redwine, 50 Mich. App. 593, 596, 213 N.W.2d 841,
843 (1973).
37. A number of courts have stated in passing that while elderly jurors may voluntarily excuse themselves under the applicable statute involved in the case before the court, such persons
are not, by virtue of their age, subject to disqualification if they choose to sit. See, e.g., Williams v.
State, 67 Ala. 183 (1880); Thomas v. State, 144 Ga. 298, 87 S.E. 8 (1915); Davison v. People, 90 I11.
221 (1878); State v. Anderson, 384 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1964).
38. 131 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1942).
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of a juror. '

39

And in United States v. Duncan,40 the court, looking to

the claims of younger potential jurors, unreflectively asserted: "We
know of no good reason why the Congress cannot require as a qualification for jury service, the minimum degree of experience and maturity
'4
presumptively represented by being 21 years old." '
Undoubtedly, the lower courts' unthoughtful responses to direct
attacks on age exclusions follow from the equally thoughtless dicta uttered by the Supreme Court. In its first decision addressing the
makeup of juries in light of the then newly adopted fourteenth amendment, the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia42 stated: "We do not say
that . . . a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and
in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to...
persons within certain ages ..... "43 That notion has since been repeated as dictum. 44
The second constitutionally based approach to ageism in the jury
context has focused on the exclusion of given age groups, rather than
on the alleged unlawfulness of age distinctions per se. Here there is
considerably more case law, albeit largely consistent in its rejection of
the ageism claims. This tack springs from the principle which the
Supreme Court has established both under the sixth amendment 45which applies to federal and state petit juries in criminal cases 46-and
under the equal protection clause-which has been applied to petit and
grand juries, both civil 47 and criminal. 48 Juries must be made up of a
"fair cross section of the community. ' 49 The premise underlying this
39. Id at 9.
40. 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 814 (1972).
41. Id at 1405.
42. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
43. Id at 310.
44. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Franklin v. South Carolina,
218 U.S. 161, 167 (1910); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880).
45. The sixth amendment provides, in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crimes shall have been
committed ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held that the sixth amendment's
impartial jury guarantee was applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 149.
47. See, e.g., McGinnis v. M.I. Harris, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Simmons v.
Jones, 317 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Ga. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973),
mod#fied, 519 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1975).
48. Application of equal protection clause principles to criminal grand juries is addressed in
a number of decisions. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); United States v.
Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 814 (1972).
49. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975) (sixth amendment). See also Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (equal protection clause).
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constitutionally based demand that the jury must represent a fair cross
section is an obvious one, as set forth by the Court in speaking about
criminal petit juries:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or
biased response of a judge. . . . This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the
populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law,
moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is
also critical
to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
50
system.
Claims of age discrimination have focused on one particular element in the equation for determining whether the fair cross section
principle has been violated: is the selection process characterized by
the absence of a cognizable group, i e., a group distinctive enough so
that its absence cuts against the jury being able to represent a fair cross
section of the community? 5' There is near unanimity in the courts' rejection of cognizability claims based on the argument that the exclusion
of a given age group adulterates the fair cross section principle. 52 Most
often, such claims have charged unconstitutional absence of the young;
50. 419 U.S. at 530 (citation omitted).
51. An often-quoted federal district court opinion has offered a three-part definition of
cognizability:
A group to be "cognizable"..
must have a definite composition. That is, there
must be some factor which defines and limits the group. A cognizable group is not one
whose membership shifts from day to day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected.
Secondly, the group must have cohesion. There must be a common thread which runs
through the group, a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience which is present
in members of the group and which cannot be adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury selection process. Finally, there must be a possibility that exclusion of the group will result in partiality or bias on the part of juries hearing cases in
which group members are involved. That is, the group must have a community of interest which cannot be adequately protected by the rest of the populace.
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'don other grounds, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976) (21- to 39-year-olds); United
States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977) (18- to 20-yearolds); United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971) (21- to 23-year-olds); Barrow v. State,
239 Ga. 162, 236 S.E.2d 257 (1977) (18- to 30-year-olds); Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 311
A.2d 483 (1973) (18- to 21-year-olds).
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970), is the one federal court exception to the
general consensus. The Butera decision did not rest on constitutional grounds, but rather on the
supervisory authority of the federal courts of appeals over the federal district courts. Id at 568.
In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137 (1974), the Supreme Court assumed for the
purpose of getting to the main issue--ie., whether a delay in updating the master jury wheel,
made up of registered voters, constituted a constitutional violation since this had the effect of
excluding young, newly enfranchised voters-that the young are an identifiable group. The Court
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sometimes the group has been defined in specific age parameters, such
as those 18 to 20 or 21 to 24, or even those 18 to 39;53 sometimes, the
claim has simply charged exclusion of "the young." United States v.
Ross54 exemplifies the standard response:
[T]he parameters of such a group ["young people"] are difficult to
ascertain, as evidenced by the widely varying ages which have been
used to define it, and . . . its membership and their values are constantly in flux. There appears to be no factor other than age which
defines this group, and we can perceive no reason to arbitrarily single
out a narrow group of "young persons" as opposed
to "middle-aged"
55
or "old" persons for purposes of jury service.
The old have fared little better under the cognizability requirement, although the case law is much more meager. In King v. United
States,56 for example, the court addressed the exclusion of those both
under 25 and over 70, and stated:
The difference in viewpoint between ages 21 and 25 would not
seem to us of any great significance. Nor would there seem to be any
substantial effect upon the composition of a jury as a result of eliminating persons over 70 as might be competent to stand duty. We
regard it as highly speculative whether the decisional outlook of such
excluded persons would be different57than that of persons a mere few
years older or a few years younger.
Social scientists, of course, might well disagree. There is documentation supporting the notion that the young can be characterized by
distinctive values, attitudes and experiences, which conceivably could
play a role in jury decisionmaking. 58 Attitudes toward draft evasion,
toward the use of drugs, and regarding premarital sexual activities are
obvious examples of issues which may arise in criminal and civil cases
where young jurors may hold different views than do their elders. Similarly, it is not purely imaginative to suggest that the aged, as a group,
likewise entertain certain particularized attitudes and views and reflect
certain distinctive experiences which set them somewhat apart. 59 Thus,
held that the showing of delay, with its consequences, did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. It did not hold that the young are a cognizable group.
State court rulings finding age groups to be cognizable are very rare. See, e.g., State v. Willis,
33 Ohio Misc. 159, 293 N.E.2d 895 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1972); State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465,
168 N.W.2d 574 (1969).
53. See the decisions cited in note 52 supra.
54. 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
55. Id at 1217.
56. 346 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1965).
57. Id at 124.
58. See Zeigler, supra note 24.
59. See Rose, The Subculture ofthe Aging." 4 Topic/or Sociological Research, in MIDDLE
AGE AND AGING 29 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968). But see Streib, Are the Aged a Minority Group?, in
MIDDLE AGE AND AGING

35 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968).
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lawyers for plaintiffs litigating employment discrimination cases, for
example, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, 60 might find the presence of older jurors a plus, given the
nature of the claims being -made.
One problem, of course, is to define age-identified groups in sufficiently distinctive ways so that they are discrete enough to be deemed
cognizable. Even if one were to accept the notion that the young as a
group are distinct, where would one draw the line between the young
and the not-young? Who is old, and who is not? 6 1 These problems

may not be insurmountable, of course. A law which bars those 70 and
over from jury duty has by its terms defined the group-it is not just an
amorphous collection of seniors, it is those over a specific age. Even
here, however, there is some difficulty in debunking the King court's
observation that the views of those 70 and over are not likely to be
significantly different from those of people aged 60 through 69; and if
that is so, the cognizability battle is lost.
There are other problems, as well, which are of a more profound
nature. If one espouses as an ideal a society which rejects ageism, there
is something a little perverse in also contending that juries must be
carefully structured so as to represent given age groups. While the benefits of the fair cross section principle are obvious and understandable,
the pursuit of that principle could have the untoward effect of emphasizing, rather than undermining, age group separation, thereby enhancing the likelihood of age discrimination generally.
Still another troubling factor here is that of practicality. Once one
proceeds down the path of recognizing some age groups as cognizable,
can one really stop? May it not become necessary to assure that each
jury has at least one person aged 18 to 25, another aged 26 to 34, still
another who falls in the 35 to 44 age range, and so on? Obviously, such
a course is impossible, and so it may be necessary to reject at the outset
age as a juridically relevant factor in determining cognizability.
The bottom line, in any event, is that in the context of jury selection, age distinctions are alive and well.

60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
61. A distinction has been drawn between the "young-old" (ages 55 to 75) and the "old-old"
(ages 76 and over). See Neugarten, Age Groups in American Society and the Rise of the YoungOld, 415 ANNALS 187 (1974).
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EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS

Equal Protection Theory
The base line for all considerations under the Constitution is that
the laws and regulations which government adopts must be rational.
The Constitution, in other words, does not comprehend irrationality.
In most instances, laws are presumed to be constitutional; they need
only meet a standard of minimum reasonableness to survive challenge
under the equal protection clause. This standard does not require that
a law be the wisest or the least burdensome or the only means for legislators to deal with a problem; it only asks whether a reasonable person
could have devised that particular law. As applied by the courts, this
approach is almost always fatal to the challenger's case: almost all laws
are rational, even though the drafters may have misunderstood the em62
pirical data or may have voted on the basis of bias or misinformation.
During the Warren Court era, an alternative line of analysis under
the equal protection clause gained prominence. 63 In certain instances,
the courts will demand more than mere rationality. Here, the burden
will be upon the state to justify its law rather than, as under the mere
rationality test, it being upon the plaintiff to prove irrationality. More
than that, the state's burden is to establish that the interest it seeks to
serve through its law is a compelling one, and that the means used to
achieve that interest--ie., the law in question-is necessary to its
achievement. 64 In contrast to the minimum rationality test, whose application almost inevitably leads to survival of the statute, the compelling interest test almost invariably produces the opposite result-the
law's demise. Even if an interest can be shown to be compelling, it is
very rare that the particular means used to achieve that interest are
65
necessary-that is, the least restrictive alternative.
A trigger for application of this more rigorous compelling interest
test is the presence of a suspect classification or a fundamental interest.
Race had been early fitted within the first category, albeit without use
62. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
63. See generally Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Aodelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
64. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
65. There are only a few instances in which a law has survived this trenchant analysis. In
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court, applying this standard, sustained the
conviction of an American of Japanese descent for violating a World War II military order which
barred such individuals from certain West Coast areas. See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). These decisions are explicable, and perhaps only justifiable, in light of the national security concerns involved.
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initially of the particular appellation of suspectness. 66 National origin
also is deemed to be a suspect classification. 6 7 That about ends the list,
68
however. Alienage is sometimes considered suspect, sometimes not.
Intimations that illegitimacy would gain this status have been rejected. 69 Gender has thus far not mustered sufficient support to enter
the list, although the Supreme Court has accorded it a status which
evokes a test more stringent than mere rationality. 70 Age, as will be
discussed later, has failed.
Just what the critical elements of suspectness are is not an altogether clear matter. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 7 1 involving an unsuccessful challenge to disparate financing of
state public education, the Court offered a synopsis of its precedents in
outlining criteria of suspectness:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
extraordinary protection from the
powerlessness as to command
72
majoritarian political process.

While the decision offers three ostensibly independent indicia of suspect classifications, others have been suggested by members of the
Court and commentators, such as the fact of the trait on which the
disparate treatment is based being immutable 7 3 or the trait being one
66. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
68. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court had held that classifications
based on alienage were suspect. In Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), however, without
overruling Graham, the Court emphasized that it had "never suggested that ... legislation [affecting aliens] is inherently invalid, nor have we held that all limitations on aliens are suspect."
Id at 294. In situations involving the state's constitutional prerogatives, ie., the vote, the holding
of political office, and employment in occupations which involve "discretionary decisionmaking,
or execution of policy, which substantially [affect] members of the political community," there
need only be a showing of "some rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected
and the limiting classification." Id. at 296.
69. Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
70. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
72. Id at 28.
73. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a plurality contended that sex
should be recognized as a suspect classification, the four justices making the argument highlighted
several elements building up to suspectness: "a long and unfortunate history of... discrimination," id at 684; "gross, stereotyped distinctions," id at 685; "pervasive, although at times more
subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena." Id at 686. Perhaps most conclusively, the Frontiero plurality
added:
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the
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which engenders social stigma. 74 Moreover, while the three factors
listed in Rodriguez were stated in the disjunctive, it is not clear whether
any one of them would be sufficient standing on its own to invoke the
mantle of suspectness. In any event, while superficially appearing to
provide some certitude simply because they are asserted in serial form,
in firm and assured language, these criteria in fact are clearly susceptible to subjective interpretation: one judge's "history of purposeful unequal treatment" may be in another judge's reading a relatively
innocuous past.
The nature of fundamental interests also is marked by some considerable ambiguity. The Court has asserted that the importance of the
interest is not a determinative criterion; rather, an interest which is fundamental is one which is either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution. 75 Rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights-most of
which concern criminal defendants-are obviously explicit; thus, they
are included within the list. But in addition, there is a vague group of
rights falling under the rubric of "liberty" whose deprivation the due
process clause directly governs. 76 Some of these were set forth in Meyer
v. Nebraska,77 with no particular emendation:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 78
members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility .... "
Id at 636-87.
74. In University of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Brennan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part with three of his colleagues, stressed stigmatization as a
critical element in the suspectness equation. Id at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This of course was a crucial linchpin in the Court's damning of the separate but
equal doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Bakke foursome concluded
that benign racial classifications which have an adverse impact upon whites should not be dealt
with in terms of the compelling interest test because such categorization does not impose stigma
upon its victims. 438 U.S. at 361-62.
75. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). This definition is
apt both for the equal protection and due process clauses.
76. The fourteenth amendment's due process clause provides:
IN]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; . ..
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. A like provision, applicable to the federal government, is contained in the fifth amendment.
77. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. Id at 399. The critical matter, of course, is what level of judicial scrutiny a liberty interest will elicit. In the Meyer Court era, the "right to contract" and the "right to engage in the

OF AGE AND THE CONSTITUTION

Privacy in procreative matters has also since joined the list under the
79
aegis of concerns falling within "liberty.
As a practical matter, since most of these rights arise directly
under the due process clause or, as with the Bill of Rights, are incorporated through that provision so as to be made applicable to the states,
claims based on their alleged deprivations will not ordinarily appear in
an equal protection context. If the right exists, its infringement alonewithout a showing of inequality in that some are accorded the right and
others are not-will suffice to make the plaintiff's case.8 0 If the right
does not exist, it will not come into being for equal protection purposes
any more than for due process purposes. Thus, the equal protection
tack is either unnecessary or will be unavailing.
The Warren Court, however, looked to the equal protection clause
as a source of certain fundamental interests which do not otherwise
appear in the Bill of Rights, the due process clause, or any other part of
the Constitution. These include equality of access to the franchise 8'
(there is no right to voteper se), 82 and an ill-defined notion of freedom
83
from indigence-related disparities in the criminal justice system.
The difficulty obviously lies in separating the suspect and the fundamental, on the one hand, from the legally less compelling, on the
other. And the critical significance of this determination, of course, recommon occupations of life" would muster considerable judicial concern. See, e.g., Smith v.
Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Today, they do not. See,
e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. Decisions involving the rights of juveniles make an equal protection attack more relevant, albeit no more successful. Here, the courts generally take the position that because of their
limited years, children cannot, in the first instance, lay claim to the full protection of rights guaranteed to adults under the due process clause and the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Thus, the careful
judicial scrutiny which would apply to a deprivation, were the grievant an adult, does not pertain.
The alternative of seeking equal protection vindication by arguing that some people-adults-are
receiving protection which other people-children-are not, thus becomes a relevant option.
However, since the equal protection clause only requires that people who are similarly situated be
treated similarly, and since the courts view children as different from, and therefore not similar to,
adults, this tack is useless. In any event, because by virtue of tender years the child has lesser
rights under the Constitution, he cannot successfully contend that a denial Qf a right constitutes
infringement of a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes. And because age is not a
suspect classification, see text accompanying note 116 infra, this approach likewise fails to elicit
special judicial scrutiny.
As to the treatment of children under the Constitution, see text accompanying notes 177-84
infra.

81. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
82. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
83.

See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 676-80 (1978).
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suits from the difference in the test-compelling interest or mere rationality-which will follow.
The inflexibility of the Court's two-level, outcome-determinative
approach-requiring the courts to either take the major step of invoking statute-destroying strict scrutiny on the one hand, or simply to leave
the litigant to minimum rationality, statute-supportive analysis on the
other-not surprisingly has generated considerable discomfort both on
the Court and outside it. The argument is made, with impressive
strength, that a more finely tuned option should be available. The most
vocal proponent on the Court for this course has been Justice Marshall,
who has regularly called for a sliding scale assessment of equal protection claims-an assessment taking into account in a flexible and more
sensitive manner the clashing individual and governmental interests at
84
stake.
Both Justice Marshall and commentators have further emphasized
that in practice, in any event, the Court has indeed moved on occasion
to a posture somewhat between the polarities of virtual judicial abdication under the guise of the minimum rationality test, and the draconian
impress of strict scrutiny. This was initially done somewhat covertly
with regard to gender discrimination; 85 ultimately, the Court openly
admitted to the intermediate level of analysis which it had been applying. 86 From time to time, in other areas also, the Court seemingly has
employed a more rigorous approach than that which would be called
for by the mere rationality precedents, this approach involving a more
87
demanding inquiry into the actual rationality of the challenged law,
as well as, at times, an apparent requirement that the purposes of the
law be articulated by its proponents, rather than conjectured upon by
88
the courts.
A key difficulty with this "rationality with bite" approach 89 is that,
outside the now openly acknowledged special case of gender distinctions, it seems to have no consistency behind it: there seem to be no
criteria discernible for predicting when the Court will, or will not, employ a more-than-minimum rationality, less-than-rigorous strict scrutiny analysis. What is clear is that the Court itself has been unwilling
84. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
86. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
87. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law.- Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1054-55 & n.34 (1979).
88. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
89. This terminology is adopted from Gunther, supra note 63, at 20-21.
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to openly embrace this intermediate approach, although lower courts
have commented upon and applied it.90
Due Process
There was a time when reliance upon the due process clause by the
courts to look at a law's ultimate wisdom and merit was a relatively
common practice. Lochner v. New York 9 1 is typically cited as a premier
example of the substantive due process era: the Court confirmed a
right of contract in the due process clause which certainly was not discernible on the face of the fourteenth amendment, and it thence proceeded to strike down a state law regulating the wages and hours of
workingmen-a law which, as the reasoning went, interfered with this
liberty of contract. While the Court claimed to be examining the law's
means in terms of simple reasonableness, it actually looked to the statute's ends, substituting its judgment for that of the legislature as to the
wisdom of the policy embodied in the statutory language.
This aggressive use of the due process clause in economic regulation cases died in the 1930s, and has yet to be resurrected. 92 Today,
statutes and rules regulating economic affairs are examined by the
courts, when they are confronted with due process-based challengese.g., claims that the affronting provisions are depriving the grievants of
their property or liberty unfairly-with the familiar minimal rationality
93
test.
Despite its demise in economic affairs, however, the due process
clause still retains considerable vigor. Substantive due process applies
in the expanding area of privacy rights-most particularly, privacy in
matters touching the marital relationship and procreation, e.g., abortion, 94 contraception 95 and sexual privacy. 96
90. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. School Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976); Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1152 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Butts v.
Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1974). Justice Marshall has likewise pointed to the
Court's actual, albeit unadmitted, employment of intermediate scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
92. Some state courts may give more significance to the import of their own state constitutions' due process clauses. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1958). But see Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational
Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1116-17 (1973), disputing that observation in the area of regulation of job qualifications.
93. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
94. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. See, e.g., id But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'dmem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

As a source of procedural protections, the due process clause is
very much alive, if not altogether well. Through it, most of the Bill of
Rights' guarantees applicable to criminal defendants vis-A-vis the fed97
eral government have been made applicable to the states as well.
Moreover, the clause has served as the source of procedural correctness
in civil settings far afield from criminal matters. Here, the Court has
confirmed that some (or many) procedural steps must accompany--either before or after the fact--the deprivation of liberty and property
interests. 98 In recent years, however, the Court has narrowly interpreted the notion of liberty interests, thus cutting down on the potential
application of the procedural guarantees of the due process clause. 99
As for property interests, the Court has made clear that these do not
spring from the Constitution itself; rather, they are created by statute,
custom or contract.1m° And in creating such interests, the state can
place limits upon them; thus, while tenure in an educational institution
constitutes a property interest, it can be circumscribed by a mandatory
retirement requirement, with the result that no procedural rights are
due when the tenured professor reaches the mandatory retirement age
triggering the termination of his tenure.' 0 '
Apart from this development of doctrine regarding liberty and
property interests in the civil context, the Supreme Court for a brief
period in the early 1970s expanded the reach of the due process clause
by condemning irrebuttable presumptions. Here the notion was that in
certain instances nothing short of individualized treatment was acceptable, at least absent very compelling reasons justifying something less.
A law which proceeds by generalization--e.g., "all persons who speed
are bad drivers, and thus will be ticketed," or "all emitters of more than
five particulates of sulfur are deemed polluters"-without affording the
individual who runs afoul of the generalization any opportunity to rebut the application of that law as applied to him, is unconstitutional
97. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 492 n.* (10th ed.

1980).
98. In determining how much process is due in a given setting, three factors must be taken
into account, according to the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976):
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
99. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972).
101. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (police officer's discharge upheld because the
permanency of his employment was made subject to the condition of it being terminable at the
will of his employer, thereby precluding his having a property interest).
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unless the generalization embodied in the law is necessarily and univer02
sally true, or there is no alternative to such law.'
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine--of particular, albeit fleeting, importance to age discrimination claims '0 3-has severe problems,
problems which have lead to its demise in considerable measure 10 4 and
its almost certain rejection within the context of age discrimination.105
10 6
For one, the notion of irrebuttable presumptions is too open-ended;
a host of laws and regulAtions can be characterized, because they regulate by generalizations, as containing such presumptions: a statute
which penalizes the emission of more than X parts per million of a
given particulate embodies an irrebuttable presumption that X + 1
parts per million particulates is dangerous; a law which limits Medicare

payments for cosmetic surgery can be described as a law embodying an
irrebuttable presumption that such surgery is not meritorious; and so
on. This being the case, legislatures could conceivably be largely disabled from enacting laws, since each legislative measure would run
afoul of the doctrine.
APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS DOCTRINES
TO AGE DISTINCTIONS

Mandatory Retirement
Challenges to age distinctions under the equal protection clause
have arisen in a number of contexts: college rules requiring students
under a certain age to live in school housing; 0 7 exclusion of children
under 5 from public school kindergarten; 0 8 exclusion of persons too

young or too old from juries; 10 9 curfews imposed upon teen-agers; I 1

102. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
103. See text accompanying notes 157-59 infra.
104. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Court held that the doctrine was not
properly applicable to legislation regulating social and economic welfare matters. Id at 769-70.
105. See, e.g., the Court's disposition in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 114-21 infra.
106. Even assuming that this open-endedness were not in itself a fatal flaw, there is an additional anomaly embodied in the doctrine. To survive challenge as an irrebuttable presumption,
the law in question must be shown to be necessarily and universally true in fact, unless it can be
shown that there is no alternative to the particular law as formulated. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 452 (1973). This is a virtually impossible standard to satisfy; moreover it seems strange
that the test which would apply for the survival of often relatively mundane statutes and regulations is stiffer even than that imposed under the equal protection clause when a race classification
is at issue, or under the due process clause when a fundamental right is at stake. Yet this is the
situation, of course, created by deployment of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.
107. See, e.g., Poynter v. Drevdahl, 359 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
108. See, e.g., Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (D. Me. 1975).
109. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
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involuntary disqualification of the under-age from voting" l ' and both
the under-age and those too old from political officeholding."1 2 It is in
the field of employment, however, that probably the most extensive
body of case law-and certainly that most thorough in its analysis of
ageism-has developed.
Two decisions by the Supreme Court have addressed age-based
mandatory retirement, and have upheld its constitutionality."t 3 Both
employed the minimum rationality test; both demonstrated great willingness to bow to legislative choice as to setting forced retirement for
public employees; and both decisions ignored the seeming aptness of
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. They leave virtually no room
for successful future challenges to mandatory retirement; indeed, the
breadth of the decisions makes successful equal protection or due process challenges to age distinctions in any context extremely dubious.
The first decision was Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia 1 4 At issue was a state law requiring the retirement of uniformed state police officers at age 50. The Murgia Court readily rejected the argument that the compelling interest test should apply;
rather, it concluded that there was no right to "governmental employment per se," 1 5 and it debunked the contention that classifications
based on age are suspect. It is this latter enterprise which is, of course,
of particular interest here. The Court asserted:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have
been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin,
have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. . . . [O]ld age does
not define a "discrete and insular" group, . . . in need of "extraordi110. See generally Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REV.
109 (1977).
I11. See text accompanying notes 165-68 infra.
112. See text accompanying notes 170-72 infra.
113. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976). Prior to these two rulings, the Court had already summarily treated mandatory
retirement claims in several cases. See, e.g., Cannon v. Guste, No. 73-134 (E.D. La. May 5, 1975),
aft'dmem., 423 U.S. 918 (1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aft'dmem.,
420 U.S. 940 (1975); Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974). Actually, in Weisbrod, the lower court had not gotten to
the merits of the mandatory retirement statute being attacked; it had dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. The lower courts in Cannon and Mellvaine had considered the merits,
however. Since summary dispositions by the Supreme Court have precedential weight, Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975), the dispositions in Cannon and Mellvaine augured poorly for
future mandatory retirees.
114. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
115. Id at 313.
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nary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it
marks 16a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal
span. I

Having dispensed with the claims which would have invoked the
compelling interest test, the Court easily found the law to be acceptable
under the standard minimum rationality approach. The aim served
was protection of the public through assurance that police are physically able; 1 7 the evidence in the trial court had established that physical ability generally declines with age. Thus, even though Officer
Murgia himself was physically fit, a statute ousting him and all others
at age 50 was certainly rational, even if individualized treatment was
sacrificed in the name of generalization:
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more precisely
through individualized testing after age 50 is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fitness is not rationally furthered by a
maximum-age limitation. It is only to say that with regard to the
interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not chosen the best
means to accomplish this purpose. But where rationality is the test, a
because
State "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."" 8
Only Justice Marshall dissented. Even he, however, was unwilling
t9
As he saw it, employto argue that age classifications are suspect."

ment is an important enough interest that the Court should have been
more sensitive to the deprivations imposed by the Massachusetts statute.' 20 He argued for his sliding scale test, which escapes the virtually
outcome-determinative minimum rationality standard, and which
could thus encompass the importance of the individual interest at stake.
He made one further notation of relevance, also. Inasmuch as the occupation at issue in the case was a physically rigorous one, the door was
still open, he maintained, for a different treatment of mandatory retirement laws when they arise in less physically demanding circumstances. 121
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id

at 313-14 (citation omitted).
at 314.
at 316 (footnote omitted).
at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 323 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

121. Id at 327 n.8 (Marshall J., dissenting). This point was developed by the Seventh Circuit
in Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979), the only still

extant federal court decision holding on constitutional groundsfor the mandatory retiree, a high
school biology teacher. The decision is likely of little vitality in the Seventh Circuit anymore, in
light of a later decision, Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906

(1979), in which the court upheld the forced retirement of judges, while totally ignoring its earlier
ruling.
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Three years later the Court decided Vance v. Bradley. 22 If anything, it revealed an even greater willingness on the Court's part to accept mandatory retirement. In upholding, by an eight to one vote, a
federal statute requiring foreign service officers to retire at age 60, the
Court stated: "[W]e will not overturn such a statute unless the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational."1 23 In thence finding
the statute to be rational, the Court was willing to accept the justification that the law, by ousting older employees, properly served to make
room for promotion of younger officers.1 24 As for the argument that
there was an insufficient relationship between age 60 and reduced physical and mental potential, the Court was not about to demand any examination by the courts of the accuracy of the age-ability correlation:
In an equal protection case of this type, .

.

. those challenging the

legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts
on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably
be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker ...
[A]ppellees were required to demonstrate that Congress had no reasonable basis for believing that. . . at age 60 or before many persons
begin something of a decline in mental and physical reliability. Appellees have not satisfied these requirements. .

.

. [Tihey admit that

122. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
123. Id at 97.
124. The Court stated:
Congress was intent not on rewarding youth qua youth, but on stimulating the highest
performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for promotion would be available. . . . Aiming at superior achievement can hardly be characterized as illegitimate, and it is equally untenable to suggest that providing promotion
opportunities through the selection-out process and through early retirement does not
play an acceptable role in the process.
440 U.S. at 101. The Court went on to reason that "the compulsory retirement age assures room
at the top at a predictable time; those in the ranks know that it will not be an intolerable time
before they will have the opportunity to compete for maximum responsibility." Id. at 103 n.20.
In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the Court upheld the Navy's up-or-out system,
established by statute, whereby officers who did not receive promotions within a certain number of
years were subjected to mandatory discharge. The system was avowedly designed to make room
for younger officers for whom, unless longer term personnel were removed, there would be no
room in the upper ranks. Id at 502. The plaintiff, ousted in accordance with the statutory
scheme, argued gender discrimination, claiming that he had been unconstitutionally victimized
because women officers were afforded a longer period of time within which to secure the promotion which would avert discharge. The Court rejected his claim. Id at 508-09.
No contention was made that unlawful age discrimination was involved. And in fact such a
claim would have been difficult to maintain: the up-or-out system was keyed to length of time in
service, not age. Moreover, as the plaintiff pointed out, men and women of the same age would be
treated differently, this fact attenuating thereby any charge of ageism. At most, there was some
age-correlated impact: typically, the officers who had served the longest would be the older ones.
But this correlation was coincidental; the system could have the same impact on the 40-year-old
with extended service as on the 50-year-old. See also Norman v. United States, 392 F.2d 255 (Ct.
Cl. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969), upholding a like statutory scheme.
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age does in fact take its toll, and that Congress could perhaps have
rationally chosen age 70 as the cutoff. . . . And we have noted the
commonsense proposition that aging-almost by definition-inevitably wears us all down. . . All appellees can say to this is that "[it
can be reasonably argued that, given modem societal facts," those
between age 60 and 70 are as reliable as those under age 60 ...
But it is the very admission that the facts are arguable that immujudgment reprenizes from constitutional
25 attack the congressional
sented by this statute.'

Given Murgia and Vance, it is hardly surprising that constitutional challenges in the lower federal courts and in the state courts to
age discrimination in mandatory retirement settings have been almost
universally unavailing.' 26 Justice Marshall's effort to leave the door
open for physically undemanding occupations has failed, as have all
other ploys: 27 retirement has been imposed without constitutional impediment on judges, 28 schoolteachers 29 and governmental bureau13 and fire fighters.' 32
crats,' 30 as well as on police officers
In some respects, criticism of the Murgia decision-from which
the result in Vance inevitably followed-is beside the point. The decision is an accomplished fact, and there is nothing since to suggest that
125. 440 U.S. at 111-12 (citations and footnotes omitted).
126. Actually, in Vance the plaintiffs did not argue that all age cutoffs were invalid; they contended that treating foreign service officers, who were forced to retire at age 60, differently than
other federal civil service employees, who at the time were not required by statute to retire until
age 70, violated equal protection. Given that age is not a suspect classification, this differential fell
under the minimum rationally standard. The Vance Court's language is so broad, however, that it
not only speaks to differentials as between two groups of employees, each required to retire at
some age, but it also goes to mandatory retirement generally.
Challenges to employment restrictions flowing from the individual's being too young-which
generally precede Murgia and which are comparatively rare--have also failed. See, e.g., Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913);
Walden-El v. Brennan, 205 Misc. 351, 125 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 A.D. 771, 128
N.Y.S.2d 578 (1954); People exrel. Moriarty v. Creelman, 206 N.Y. 570, 100 N.E. 446 (1912). See
generally Annot., 152 A.L.R. 579 (1944).
127. Since Vance, the Supreme Court has adhered to its anti-retiree position in summary dispositions which, while not involving the issuance of opinions, are of precedential significance. See
note 113 supra. See, e.g., Slate v. Noll, 474 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1979), aft'dmem., 444 U.S.
1007 (1980); Fazekas v. University of Houston, 565 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 440 U.S. 952 (1979); Schmier v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 74 Cal. App. 3d 314, 141
Cal. Rptr. 472 (1977), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
128. See, e.g., Mailmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 361
(1980); Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979).
129. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945
(1979); Klain v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 434 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Pa. 1977), aff'dmem., 577 F.2d
726 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
945 (1979), discussed in note 121 supra; Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Hawaii 601, 546 P.2d 1005 (1976).
130. See, e.g., Issarescu v. Cleland, 465 F. Supp. 657 (D.R.I.), aff'dmem., 601 F.2d 572 (1st
Cir. 1979).
131. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
132. See, e.g., Bonnette v. Karst, 261 La. 850, 261 So. 2d 589 (1971).
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the Court has had second thoughts, as evidenced by Vance itself.
Nonetheless, the ruling is significantly flawed, and it cannot be passed
by without highlighting the problems.
The Court's treatment of the suspect classification argument was
remarkably brief. The brevity is itself noteworthy-whatever the
protestations of opponents of ageism, the vice of age discrimination
clearly was not one which the Murgia Court, at least, saw as sufficiently
significant to evoke much attention. 133 In any event, the ruling is more
interesting for what the Court did say than for what it did not. Clearly,
a history of mistreatment is a basic element in establishing suspectness.
In the case of racial minorities, this factor is generally readily perceivable-certainly no one would question the long and invidious history
of deprivation imposed upon blacks in this nation. For some justices,
women as a group possess a similarly bleak past. 134 In Murgia, the
Court found this element lacking; the elderly do not exhibit a "history
of purposeful unequal treatment"'' 35 akin to that experienced by racial
and ethnic minorities, nor, obviously, even a history of denial approaching that of women.
The Court's conclusion is difficult to dispute. The elderly are victimized in a variety of ways, and have been for a long time; nonetheless, their group history does not reveal a litany of violence,
disenfranchisement and subordination equivalent to that of racial minorities or women. This is not to say that older people do not have
significant and real grievances; it is to say, however, that those grievances do not arise out of, or reveal, the same background of iniquity.
Even granting the correctness of the Court's assessment, one may
rightly ask whether the Court could have done a better job of substantiating its position. The answer it arrived at is not so overwhelmingly
obvious that some annotation was not in order. And indeed, had the
Court essayed the task, it would have found that the treatment of the
old is clearly not all of a beneficent piece. Few historical studies exist.
Those that do have their imperfections. But at least one historian has
concluded that contrary to what is perhaps the generally accepted mythology, the elderly were not, in our nostalgically recalled past, consistently the objects of veneration. Rather, "late in the eighteenth century,
133. Indeed, the Murgia decision was handed down in a per curiam ruling, i.e., the Court's
opinion did not bear the name of its author. This typically is regarded as a signal that the decision
is not considered a particularly important one, or that its resolution is particularly easy. See L.
HODDER-WILLIAMs, THE POLITICS OF THE SUPREME COURT 96 (1980).
134. See the opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
135. 427 U.S. at 313.
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. . .[tjhe social status of the aged, which had risen for nearly two hundred years, began to fall instead."' 36 And "during the nineteenth century, expressions of hostility to old age grew steadily stronger in

America.

. .

."137

While in this century a change in attitudes towards

the aged occurred again, it was not one elevating them in status, but
rather one involving the perception of the elderly as powerless and dependent. The old came to be seen as a social problem, needful of society's aid.-a perception, in other words, of old people as less than full
and equal participants in, and contributors to, the social fabric.
One need not equate the treatment of the old with that of blacks,
then, to nonetheless conclude that the old indeed do bear some aspects
of second class citizenship, so far as social attitudes regarding their
far as those attitudes translate into
roles in society are concerned and13so
8
official and unofficial treatment.
A second element of suspectness asks that the group at issue be
one saddled with disabilities. Again, the Murgia Court was readily satisfied that the aged missed the mark. They were right, but again too
cavalierly so. As with the matter of past history, so too with the present
posture of the old: while they are victims on occasion of disadvantage
imposed because of age, they lack that pervasive, multifaceted texture
of burdens which characterizes the truly suspect-e.g., racial and ethnic minorities.' 39 Still, there is enough documentation to warrant at
least some hesitancy in concluding that all is right with the world of
seniors; enough so, certainly in the eyes of Congress, which has passed
a number of legislative measures designed to combat age discrimina136. D. FISCHER, GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 224 (exp. ed. 1978).
137. Id at 225. Henry David Thoreau, writing in WALDEN, revealed his perception of the
aged: "I have lived some thirty years on this planet, and I have yet to hear the first syllable of
valuable or even earnest advice from my seniors. They have told me nothing and probably cannot
tell me anything, to the purpose." H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN 9 (J. Shanley ed. 1971). See generally B. Strong, Aging and the Law, Part XVI, History of Aging (1979) (curriculum materials
developed by Senior Adults Legal Assistance, Palo Alto, Cal.)
138. Eighty years before the Murgia decision, the Court itself perhaps implied a perception
that age attitudes had some correlation with other negative biases:
The State may not say that all white men shall be subjected to the payment of the attorney's fees of parties successfully suing them and all black men not. It may not say that
all men beyond a certain age shall be alone thus subjected, or all men possessed of a
certain wealth. These are distinctions which do not furnish any proper basis for the
attempted classification.
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
139. Indeed, in some respects the elderly have been very successful. At the beginning of 1979,

there were at least 48 major federal programs designed for their benefit. See HOUSE SELECT
COMM. ON AGING, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ELDERLY, COMM. PuB. No. 95-167, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (Comm. Print 1979). "Others, using a narrower definition of the term 'program' have listed as many as 134." Neugarten, Policyfor the 1980s." Age or Need Entitlement?, in
NATIONAL JOURNAL ISSUES BOOK 48, 50 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Policyfor the 1980s].
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tion.140

Where the Murgia Court clearly did go astray, it seems, was in its
assertion that the elderly have not "been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities."' 4 1 Again, no authority was cited for this pronouncement. More important, the very fact of the law at issue in the case
would seem to belie the Court's unreflective statement. The whole
thrust of the legal attack on mandatory retirement, and on age discrimination in employment generally, is bottomed on a proposition which
the Court unblinkingly and unthinkingly rejected: ageism perpetrated
against seniors constitutes a unique disability built on a stereotype
which is unrelated to older workers' abilities. 42 Indeed, there is a very
140. These include the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f
(1976), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-478, §§ 401(a)-(d), 92 Stat. 1555 (1978).
141. 427 U.S. at 313. Forty years earlier, in Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.
330 (1935), the Court, as yet uncommitted to a deferential role in scrutinizing economic regulations, was considerably less willing to engage in unsubstantiated speculation about the performance of older workers. In Alton, the Court struck down the newly enacted Railroad Retirement
Act. Among the unsuccessful justifications offered by the government in support of the law was
the contention that the pension payments required by it would have the benefit of easing older
workers out of their jobs. To this Justice Roberts responded: "This view assumes they will be
retained for years and are incompetent to do what they are now doing. Evidence is lacking to
support either supposition." Id at 352.
142. Former Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz reported to Congress in 1965 that
"[p]hysical capability is by far the most prominent single reason advanced for imposing upper age
limits [on employment]." U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER 8 (1965). As a

matter of hard data, the generalization that older workers cannot, and do not, perform as well as
their younger colleagues appears fallacious. See generally Kelleher & Quirk, Age, Physical Capacity and Work.- An Annotated Bibliography, INDus. GERONTOLOGY 80 (Fall 1973); Drucker &
Moore, Mandatory Retirement: Pas, Present and Future ofan.Anachronism, 5 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1,
5-6 (1977); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 924, 935-36 (1975); Note,
Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem ofthe Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
396-99 (1966); Note, The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 748, 773-77 (1975). Indeed, this generalization contradicts a number of private and governmental studies establishing the contrary. The Committee on Aging of the American Medical
Association reported, for example:
[Ulseful working life (and not merely life) is being prolonged. If capable, workers
should be allowed to work if they so desire, even beyond the usual retirement age...
workers between 60 and 75 years of age are not only proving to be capable of working in
many occupations; they actually excel younger persons because of their superior judgment, experience, and safety of performance. Advances in technology that have taken
away much of the physical stress of work tend in many instance [sic] to place a premium
on the abilities that many older workers possess.
American Medical Ass'n, Employment of Older People 10 (n.d.) (pamphlet published by AMA
Committee on Aging) (quoting from Special Committee of the Gerontological Society, Report, 9
GERONTOLOGIST 23 (Pt. II, Winter 1969)).

More pointedly, a study of 132,316 workers in New York State's public agencies (which utilized age 70 as the mandatory retirement age even before lower ages were barred by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189
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respectable body of data which undercuts the canard, which the Court

apparently accepted, that ability declines with age. Aging, rather, is an
individualized process, and generalizations about ability to perform being correlated with age are inept and inapt. In fact, there are more

within a given age group than there are between
individual variations
43
age groups.

1

(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979)), which raised the statute's coverage to age 70), established that workers over 65 are "about equal to" and sometimes "noticeably better" than younger
workers in job performance. Improving the Age DiscriminationLaw, A Working Paperofthe Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). "They are at least as punctual in
reporting to work, have fewer on-the-job accidents and are less often absent from work because of
illness, accidents or unexplained reasons." Id. Accord, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, RESEARCH MATERIALS 87 (1965).

143. See generally Kutscher & Walker, ComparativeJob Performance of Office Workers by
Age, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 39 (1960). Moreover, "there is no objective evidence to support any
generalized relationship between age and ability as measured by productivity." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, UTILIZATION OF OLDER PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC WORKERS 9 (1961).
See also Improving the Age DiscriminationLaw, A Working Paperof the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
Older workers, it appears, are not only able to produce a volume of work equal to that produced by younger employees, but in some circumstances they even outproduce their younger
counterparts. See Age Discriminationin Employment.- Hearingsof/he Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 370-71 (1969). One study of female federal employees established:
Among women, there was very little variation in average output per man-hour among
the different age groups except that output was significantly below average for the
youngest, for whom the lack of experience was apparently an important factor ...
. . .In the Federal Government, women employees aged 65 and over had the highest average relative to the base group of women 35 to 44 years old.
Kutscher & Walker, ComparativeJob Performance of Office Workers by Age, 83 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 39, 40-41 (1960).

Similarly, the scientific studies disclose that the stereotype of the older person with limited or
declining mental and intellectual abilities is false. Intellectual ability can increase for virtually as
long as the individual lives-on up through the 70s, 80s, and even 90s. Thus, a summary of a
number of studies conducted as to older people's mental and intellectual abilities reported:
News reporters never tire of pointing out that Golda Meir works 20-hour days, yet is
in her mid-70s, and a grandmother. Time, in a recent story on William 0. Douglas,
noted that the blue eyes of the 75-year-old Justice "are as keen and alert as ever. So, too,
is [his) intellect." This sort of well-intended but patronizing compliment betrays a widespread assumption that intelligence normally declines in advanced adulthood and old
age, and that people like Meir and Douglas stand out as exceptions.
In our opinion, general intellectual decline in old age is largely a myth. During the
past 10 years, we and our colleagues,. . . have worked to gain a better understanding of
intelligence in the aged. Our findings challenge the stereotyped view, and promote a
more optimistic one. We have discovered that the old man's boast, "I'm just as good as I
ever was," may be true, after all.
Baltes & Schaie, The Myth of the Twilight Years, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 35, 35 (March 1974). See
also Green, Age, Intelligence andLearning, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 29 (Winter 1972); TOWARD AN
INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY (H. Sheppard ed. 1970); Withers, Some IrrationalBeliefs About Retirement in the United States, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 23, 27 (Winter 1974); Note, Mandatory Re-

tirement-A Vehicle For Age Discrimination, 51 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 116, 119 (1974); Note, Age
Discriminationin Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 924, 935 n.64 (1975); Note, The Constitutional
Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 748, 775 (1975).
Given the breadth of data, it appears clear that whatever the predominance of mandatory
retirement as a practice in the workplace, its sustaining primary logic--the supposed incompe-
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Now, it may well be that the courts generally do not want to arbitrate as to conflicting scientific data. It may be beyond their ken to
determine whether, as to a given job, data showing some heightened
risk of cardiovascular crises is offset by compensating benefits resulting
from older employees' heightened caution. The institutional inability
of the courts to cope with the problem thus leads to endorsement of the
minimum rationality test, given that it enables judicial abdication.
Confession of inability or indifference, however, is at least more honest
and accurate than is the kind of self-serving, unsubstantiated pronouncement uttered by the Murgia majority.
Finally, the Murgia Court offered some reasoning both obvious
and subtle. It stated that "even old age does not define a 'discrete and
insular' group, . . . in need of 'extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.'"'144 This is because old age simply
"marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal
span."' 145 At one level, of course, the Court had it right; short of the
(usually) worse alternative, old age awaits us all. The significance of
this observation, however, was not explained by the Court, although
fleshing it out is not so difficult.
The first notion buried in the Court's statement is recognition of
the fact that any given age is not immutable. The 5-year-old grows to
be 10, the 50-year-old advances to 55 and 60 and beyond. Thus, age is
a quality different from race and gender, which are unchanging and
unchangeable, and so the unfairness of imposing burdens based on race
and gender is attenuated in the age context. A law which discriminates
against blacks can never be eluded by its targets, nor will it ever harm
tence of the older worker-is not persuasive. This data, by the way, applies equally to skilled
workers as to the unskilled:
Actual records of work performed showed greater differences in productivity within age
groups than among different ages. Large proportions of workers in the older groups
exceeded the average performance of younger workers. Moreover, older workers had a
steadier rate of output.
Results were similar for every occupational group surveyed-office workers, operatives, and mail sorters--as well as for higher versus lower skilled workers, and time versus incentive workers.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1721, THE EMPLOYMENT
PROBLEMS OF OLDER WORKERS 20 (1971).
This is not to say that there is no association between age and ability; the flaw comes in trying
to generalize from specific instances of illness or weakness or inefficiency to the broad class of
those over 65 or 70 or whatever. See generally Note, ConstitutionalAttacks on MandatoryRetirement.- A Reconsideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549, 552-53 (1976); Fozard & Carr,Age Differences
and PsychologicalEstimates ofAbilities and Skills, INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 75, 86 (Spring 1972).
144. 427 U.S. at 313 (citation omitted).
145. Id at 313-14.
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whites. A law which makes an age distinction, however, need not victimize forever. It can be outgrown.
As far as it goes, this reasoning makes sense. Indeed, it is at the
core, perhaps, of accepting laws which limit and control children. A
law which bars youngsters under age 16 from obtaining drivers'
licenses may be discriminatory, particularly in the eyes of 14- and 15year-olds, 14 6 but at least it is not permanently inescapable. The logic,
however, breaks down in the context of laws such as the very one
before the Murgia Court--.e., laws which impose disadvantages for
being too old. We do, after all, only grow in one direction--older.
Thus, there was nothing that Officer Murgia could ever do to overcome
the barrier to employment erected by the out-at-50 statute. He was
never going to become less than 50. Thus, it is not right to reason that a
given group, defined by its being too old for whatever is the privilege or
benefit claimed, is altogether different than other groups readily recognized as being defined by the immutable characteristic of race or gender. To the extent, then, that immutability is a significant factor in the
suspectness equation-and it is147-people deemed too old do have a
better claim on securing at least some enhanced constitutional status
than the Murgia Court was willing to acknowledge.
The question of immutability merges into the other notion encased
in the Court's reasoning about the old not being a discrete and insular
group needful of judicial protection. The notion goes thusly: judicial
intervention is most needed when the political process is working in
such a manner that those who are the subjects of laws do not have a
voice in their enactment, or at least an effective voice. 148 For blacks,
for example, majoritarian democracy is a risky enterprise; they simply
do not have the numbers to win in the political process. More than
that, because they are a minority-and the typical legislature will be
made up of a majority of whites-there is the real risk that those in
power will rather blithely impose deprivations on those who are powerless. 149 After all, we know that human nature is flawed; thus, white
146. See, e.g., Berberian v. Petit, 118 R.I. 448, 455, 374 A.2d 791, 795 (1977).
147. See note 73 supra. See also notes 208-20 infra and accompanying text.
148. This notion was articulated by Chief Justice Stone in his famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and formed the basis for the development of the heightened scrutiny approach accorded certain interests and classifications in the
Warren Court era. This notion, however, certainly has not carried the day in all contexts, for
numerous groups finding themselves to be minorities are accorded nothing more than the mere
rationality test. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
149. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 933-35 (1973). This idea that the minority group, or the group without political power, is
needful of special judicial protection, or that at least the judiciary should scrutinize carefully those
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legislators, who can never be black, may have little pause in passing
legislation which disadvantages blacks, inasmuch as the inequity thus
created can never directly impinge on those passing the law. Here,
then, is the juncture at which the courts should be most suspicious, for
if blacks cannot secure relief in the judicial forum, they are defenseless.
Thus, racial classifications are suspect, with the result that the courts
will look upon them with particular cynicism and demand rigorous justification if they are to survive.
But we all will become old, the Murgia Court tells us. Thus, the
same risk that inheres in a white-dominated legislature passing legislation affecting blacks does not pertain. Human nature dictates that people watch out for themselves, so legislators are hardly likely to pass
laws which harm the old, given that they themselves will ultimately
join the club of people whom they are now victimizing.
There is a further amplification of this theme. Few white legislators may have close personal or even professional contacts with blacks:
thus they may too readily view blacks as somehow alien, with the consequence that a kind of political xenophobia arises which insulates the
consciences of the whites when they pass race-based laws. On the other
hand, we all have, or had, a mother and a father; given the growing
numbers of particularly old people, 1 0 many adults even have grandmothers and grandfathers still living. This fact, then, further undercuts
the likelihood of pernicious ageist legislation, since the legislator who
votes to disadvantage the elderly is likely to be harming his own.
The Murgia majority's rather cryptic assessment of realpolitik has
its problems. One flaw lies in the Court's failing to take into account
the psychology of youth, and even of middle age. The "non-old" do
not expect to grow old. Of course they know that that fate lies ahead,
as an intellectual matter. But as a factor which governs their actions
today, it is a reality which is in some manner ignored or suppressed. 15 '
laws which impact adversely upon the powerless, is of course not limited to equal protection
doctrine. Under the commerce clause, judicial analysis of state regulation regards the disenfranchisement of those affected by a commerce-regulating law as a significant element in the determination of the legitimacy of the law. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945). In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), too, the Court developed this
concept in considering the legitimacy of a state law taxing a national bank, in a situation where
those subjected to the tax-the national citizenry whose bank it was-had no vote in the state
legislative forum, wherein the tax was adopted.
150. The greatest rate of population growth is in the age group 75 and over. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEW, STATISTICAL REPORTS ON OLDER AMERICANS: SOME PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ELDERLY POPULATION (1978).
151. See S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE COMING OF AGE 13 (1972):

When we look at the image of our own future provided by the old we do not believe it:
an absurd inner voice whispers that that will never happen to us-when that happens it
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Thus, to confidently rely upon the self-interest of the future old is to
take a stance not quite fitting with the reality of the presently "nonold"; from their perspective, the old are in many ways "them," and not

6us.9

Another defect in the Court's posture lies in its apparent analysis
of how legislation comes to be. The underlying implicit assumption
seems to be that a legislator makes a choice--either to hurt the old or
not. But, in fact, as to any given piece of legislation there may be a
variety of factors which complicate the computation. Mandatory retirement laws, for example, are not simply products of a choice between
harming seniors or not doing so. Into the mix go arguments that
mandatory retirement is needed to make room for the young; to get rid
of deadwood; to make it easier for employers to terminate employees
without having to engage in costly individualized testing; to make it
easier for employees who are actually declining to avoid being forced
to admit that fact by giving them the excuse that an immutable retirement requirement was the sole basis for their ouster; and so on. 152 A
legislator called upon to vote for or against a mandatory retirement
law, then, may recognize that it is harmful to older people and yet he
may still vote for it because it serves other ends which he considers
worthy. And he may do so even while realizing that he harms his father today, and himself tomorrow.
Finally, there is the fact that legislation is selective. Even a legislator who appreciates in a directly felt way the fact that he will become
old still may vote for a law forcing the retirement of police officers at
age 50 or at age 60, given that he neither is, nor ever intends to be, a
police officer himself. The club of retired police is not one which, in
fact, he will be joining.
Having said all that, there is still difficulty in persuasively maintaining that the old are powerless, and therefore in need of extraordi1 53
nary protection. Their numbers are certainly considerable.
will no longer be ourselves that it happens to. Until the moment is upon us old age is
something that only affects other people.
152. See generally HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS, COMM. PUB. No. 95-91, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32

(Comm. Print 1977). See also Waldman & Levine, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitutional?...
Serves a Valid and Legal Social Purpose, I Ctr. LIB. REV. 98 (Fall 1974).

153. Older Americans constitute approximately 11% of the population and in some states this
proportion is even higher. In 1975 nine states had more than 12% older persons: Florida (16.1%),
Arkansas (12.8%), Iowa (12.7%), Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska (12.6%), South Dakota (12.5%),

Oklahoma (12.3%), and Rhode Island (12.2%). California and New York each have more than
two million older citizens, and more than one million reside in each of five states-Pennsylvania,
Florida, Texas, Illinois and Ohio. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, PART I-DEVELOPMENTS

IN AGING: 1975 AND JANUARY-MAY

1976, S. REP. No. 94-998, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. xv (1976).
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Moreover, older Americans constitute the fastest growing segment of
the population. Between 1970 and 1979 the over-65 population grew
154
by 23.5%, whereas the under-65 population increased by only 6.3%.
Given that many elderly are not isolated from the political mainstream,
their voices obviously can be, and are being, heard. 155 They have, as a
matter of fact, been strikingly successful in securing government bene56
fits and assistance.1
As for the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the MAurgia Court
made no mention of it. This could not have been mere accident. The
lower court, 157 in ruling for the state trooper, had explicitly relied upon
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,15 8 a key irrebuttable presumption decision. Moreover, just two years earlier, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist had strongly dissented in LaFleur, gloomily
prognosticating that the logic of the majority opinion, which struck
down mandatory pregnancy leaves for school teachers because such a
requirement left no room for individual determination of whether a
given teacher was physically capable of performing her job, would inevitably lead to the demise of mandatory retirement laws. 159 Surely,
their prophecy could not have been forgotten, wrong though it proved
to be. The Murgia Court's silence undoubtedly imparted a message: if
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was not otherwise dead, it at
least had nothing to offer for the analysis of age distinctions.
Voting and Candidacy
As already noted, the most thorough analysis-albeit cursory--of
the constitutionality of age distinctions under the equal protection
clause has developed in the context of employment discrimination. It
should be clearly understood, however, that use of the minimum ra154. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, PART I-DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1979, S. REP.

No. 96-613, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. xvi (1980).

155. Of all age groups, the elderly have the second best record of electoral participation. "In
the 1974 elections, older people were 14.8 per cent of the 18+ voting age population but cast 17
per cent of the votes. Some 51 per cent of the older population voted, the highest proportion of all
age groups except for the middle aged from 45 through 64." SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
PART I-DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1975 AND JANUARY-MAY 1976, S.REP. No. 94-998, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. xviii (1976). See also R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 324-28
(1975). But see Binstock, Aging and the Future of American Politics, 415 ANNALS 199 (1974);
Binstock, Interest-GroupLiberalism and the Politicsof Aging, 12 GERONTOLOGIST 265, 412 (Pt. I,
Autumn 1972).
156. See note 139 supra.
157. Murgia v. Commonwealth of Mass. Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D. Mass.
1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
158. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
159. Id at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tionality test to measure alleged age-based wrongs is not confined to
that sphere alone. To enhance that understanding, one can look to another arena where the use of age distinctions is common, and challenges similarly treated-restrictions on the franchise and public
officeholding.
A particularly consistent-and obvious-use of an age cutoff in
our society has been reliance upon attainment of a certain age, almost
invariably age 21, as the trigger for securing the franchise. 60 It is only
since adoption of the twenty-sixth amendment that the voting age has
been lowered nationwide to age 18.161 Even that development did not
suggest a social rejection of age distinctions; rather, it simply established an earlier date for the onus of an age barrier to fall away.
A corollary to the use of an age requirement for voting has been
employment of age criteria as predicates for running for, and holding,
public office.162 Here, there has been more variation, with age 21 not
63
holding such complete preeminence as the critical demarcation.
Moreover, there also has been some use of age maxima, whereby individuals who are too old are barred from office.' 64 This, of course, is a
use of age distinctions which is not found in the voting context.
On a number of occasions the Supreme Court in dicta has observed that age restrictions on the franchise are acceptable.1 65 Thus,
even though the Court has established that equality of access to the
franchise is a fundamental interest, 66 which would ordinarily evoke
the compelling interest test, lower courts-taking their cue from that
dicta-have applied the mere rationality test. In YMCA Vote at 18
160. As to the development of age 21 as the common age for attainment of the franchise, see
Forkosch, The Inability of Congress to Impinge on Stale Power to Set ElectoralAge Qualiflcations,
47 CHI-KENT L. REV. 83, 93-111 (1970); James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22
(1960).
161. The twenty-sixth amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
162. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
163. Id See also Canavan v. Messina, 31 Conn. Supp. 447, 334 A.2d 237 (1973) (age 28
minimum requirement for mayor); Humphreys v. Walls, 169 Md. 292, 181 A. 735 (1935) (age 25
minimum requirement for judicial office).
164. See, e.g., Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979)
(elected state court judges forced to retire at age 70).
165. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 625 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673, 675 n.4 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963).
166. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969).
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Club v. Board of Elections, 167 for example, the federal district court
simply asserted that the state has a valid interest in protecting the integrity of the franchise through the "intelligent use of the ballot," 6 8 an
interest furthered by a minimum age requirement.
The case law concerning candidacy for the holding of public office
has been equally unresponsive to discrimination contentions. Two
tacks have been generally pursued. It has been argued that the agebarred candidate is denied equal protection because of the disparate
treatment accorded him, as compared to age-qualified office seekers. A
related contention is that voters who support the aggrieved potential
candidate are constitutionally injured, since they are precluded from
voting for the candidate of their choice. Since there is no fundamental
right to be a candidate' 69 and since age is not deemed to be a suspect
classification, differential treatment of political aspirants or officeholders who are of different ages evokes only the minimum rationality test;
thus, the first tack has been unavailing. Accordingly, in Trafelet v.
Thompson,' 7 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit readily upheld a state law requiring the retirement of state court
judges (who were elective officials) at age 70:
The legislature could rationally have justified treating judges differently from other officials on the ground that the work of judges
makes unique and exacting demands on faculties that age tends to
erode. Although the defenders of the statute were not required to
establish by evidence a rationality that is obvious from the common
experience of mankind, . . . they nevertheless did so. . . . It is irrelevant that evidence was adduced to rebut this data: ". . . It is not
within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety." 171
Insofar as the discrimination claim is bottomed on the alleged deprivation of the fundamental interest in equality of access to the franchise of
the voters denied their candidate, the courts, looking to the Supreme
Court dicta that age restrictions as to voters need only be addressed
under the rationality test, have similarly examined candidate restric172
tions in this light and have found them satisfactory.
167. 319 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
168. Id at 546.
169. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 643-44 (1978).

170. 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979).
171. Id at 627 (citation omitted) (quoting from Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S.
342, 357 (1916)). But see Daley v. Farm Credit Admin., 454 F. Supp. 953 (D. Minn. 1978).
172. See, e.g., Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. I (N.D. III. 1973); Wurtzel v. Falcey, 69
N.J. 401, 354 A.2d 617 (1976).
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The Special Place of Children
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia17 3 and Vance v.
Bradley174 the Court addressed claims of age discrimination raised by
people who claimed they were denied equal protection by virtue of being deemed too old. In the voting cases the claims were made, again
typically on equal protection grounds, by plaintiffs just short of the age
of legal maturity. 7 5 And in the jury cases, too, the claimants typically
were individuals who were adults or on the verge of adulthood; many
of those cases, of course, arose under the sixth amendment, although a
76
number likewise invoked the equal protection clause.'
Younger individuals---children-have increasingly come before
the Court also. It is safe to say that for equal protection purposes,
childhood status is not deemed to be a suspect classification. The Court
has not so held, but its decisions can leave little doubt in that regard. 177
Perhaps because of this perception, it has been due process analysis
which has typically been employed by the Court. In other words,
claims by children of denial of privacy rights or of rights allegedly protected by the first amendment have not been treated by examining
whether the disparity in treatment as between children, on the one
hand, and adults on the other, raises an equal protection problem;
rather, the Court has looked to the right at issue and assessed whether a
78
child can lay claim to it as a matter of fairness.1
In some instances, such claims have succeeded. Children clearly
are not outside the constitutional pale; they do have rights under the
first amendment; 179 they have privacy rights;180 they have valid procedural due process claims in both civil' 8 1 and criminal 1 82 settings. At
the same time, however, it is clear that these rights are of a lesser di173. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
174. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
175. See notes 160-68 and accompanying text supra. In some cases, first amendment arguments were also made. See, e.g., Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I11. 1973).
176. See notes 24-61 and accompanying text supra.
177. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion as to
minors' access to contraceptives).
178. Of course, in some instances equal protection analysis simply would be inappropriate. In
the high school setting, for example, one would not be able to argue a denial of equal protection
arising out of summary expulsions, since all students were treated the same. Lack of procedural
due process would be the ground for attack. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
179. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1975); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
180. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
182. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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mension for youngsters; children may be subjected to impositions and
83
restrictions which, if they were placed upon adults, would not stand. 1
Justice Powell, writing for himself and three other members of the
Court in Bellotti v. Baird,i8 4 a decision addressing the constitutionality
of a parental consent requirement for minors to obtain abortions, explained the rationale for this diminished status under the Constitution:
[T]he status of minors under the law is unique in many respects....
The unique role in our society of the family,. . . requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the
special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature
85 manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing.'
One can disagree with specific rulings by the courts. It seems safe
and proper to conclude, however, that there are real and tangible differences between children and adults-differences which at least on
some occasions properly translate into disparity of treatment and of
rights and responsibilities. The problem for the ardent opponent of
ageism is to mount an attack on age distinctions which takes cognizance of this reality. It is common enough to contend, for example,
that mandatory retirement is a vice; indeed, this is the ageist practice
which has most caught the fancy of commentators. Complexity intrudes, however, in drawing some respectable limit to the arguments
made against the forced ouster of older workers from their jobs. For if
the use of an age line is deemed improper as a basis for determining
who may work and who may not when the victim is old, may it not
follow that child labor laws, indeed any laws using age lines, to distribute rights and privileges and responsibilities, are imperiled?
Of course, one can simply say that children are different, and
therefore differential treatment is acceptable. But that is really too
shallow; one could say, also, that old people are different. What one
would wind up with would be a debate among social scientists, with
judges being called upon to make fine calibrations between differing
theories of childhood development, age identification, psychomotor
functioning and the like. It is preferable to attempt to place children,
183. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
184. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
185. Id at 633-34 (citations omitted). The Court struck down the law, but a majority was in
accord that restrictions not supportable vis-a-vis adults could be imposed upon immature minors.

OF AGE AND THE CONSTITUTION

youths, young adults, middle-aged adults and elders, within some unified schemata which recognizes that they all are subjected to age distinguishing, and which further allows for some assessment of when age
distinctions are tolerable and when they are not.
The Special Problem of Special Benefits
One of the perturbing aspects of any campaign against ageism resides in the potential for tunnel vision on the part of those who condemn the vices of discrimination. Most commonly, protests against age
discrimination emanate from those who are advocates for seniors.
That they have legitimate grievances need not be contested. There is
enough in our laws, practices and attitudes to confirm that the elderly
indeed are victims of negative stereotyping and pejorative regard by
those younger than they.
The problem is that at the same time as they suffer, the elderly also
benefit. Indeed, so do children, who are also the subjects of advocacy
by special interest groups seeking vindication of rights. Both the particularly young and the old are the recipients of benefits and entitlements which are bestowed upon them because they are old or young:
there are a host of governmental programs specifically designed for,
and confined to, children' 86 and the elderly. 87 A persuasive empirical
case can be made, then, that the true victims of ageism are those between approximately ages 22 and 60; they are the ones ineligible for
subsidized mass transit fares, and special job training programs, and
specialized medical support programs, and so on.
If one wants to argue that ageism is a vice of constitutional dimensions, one can hardly escape confronting this reality. Indeed, it is likely
correct to say that almost every age-correlated benefit for one person
can be characterized as a deprivation for another. After all, cannot the
40-year-old welfare mother, with three children and no husband, legitimately decry as age discriminatory a reduced fare plan operating in her
city's mass transit system which extends a subsidy to those under 18
and over 60, while closing her out and thus requiring her to pay full
fare each day as she takes public transportation in search of a job?
Cannot the 55-year-old identify as ageism the Social Security system's
minimum age requirement for eligibility-a requirement which excludes him from benefits for several more years?
186. See generally Teitelbaum, The Age Discrimination Act and Youth, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV.
969 (1981).
187. See note 139 supra.
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In brief, if the advocates against ageism seriously want to urge the
abolition of age distinctions as a primary mechanism of social control,
they had best consider that they may have to give up some good for the
sake of obtaining an end to the bad. That is so, at least, unless one can
fashion a respectable analysis which finds some meaningful difference
between age lines which are employed to benefit the old or the young
(and which thereby necessarily burden those in between) and age lines
which impose deprivation upon them.
SYNTHESIS

It belabors the obvious to observe that the courts have been consistently unsympathetic to constitutionally based claims of age discrimination. Why this is so is not entirely clear. In some measure,
undoubtedly, the courts' indifference simply reflects their perception of
the problem: for them ageism is just not a vice, or at least not enough
of an evil to warrant judicial intervention. If the legislatures want to
rely upon the use of age distinctions, so be it; the most the courts will
do is to ask if such uses are rational, a question which carries with it
88
almost inevitably an affirmative answer.
But there are undoubtedly other factors at work. One particular
problem centers on defining the victims. The Murgia Court, for example, was clearly troubled by the fact that the class for which the police
officer contended was unclear in its parameters. It observed that "[t]he
class subject to the compulsory retirement feature . . . consists of...
officers over the age of 50. [The law] cannot be said to discriminate
only against the elderly. Rather, it draws the line at a certain age in
middle life."' 189 Likewise, in the jury cases, the courts have been resistant to viewing the young as a cognizable group because they do not
find them to be a distinctive enough collection of individuals.
There is a real problem here, no doubt. Typically, a racial group is
readily identifiable. So, too, are ethnic groups, and men and women
are likewise distinct. When one starts speaking of age, however, ambi188. On very rare occasions an age line will fail to survive even under the rationality test. See,
e.g., Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980); Daley v. Farm
Credit Admin., 454 F. Supp. 953 (D. Minn. 1978).
189. 427 U.S. at 313. Actually, the Court itself manufactured unnecessary confusion. The
Court opened its discussion of suspectness by addressing "the class of uniformed state police officers.
... Id It then turned to the "treatment of the aged," which was then followed by
discussion of "[tlhe class subject to the compulsory retirement feature... [as consisting] of uniformed state police officers over the age of 50." Id Thus, the Court seemed to want to focus on
police officers as a group, the aged as a group, and police officers over 50 as a group. See Branch
v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976), characterizing Aurgia as having held that "state
... Id at 1133.
uniformed policemen were not a suspect class.
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guity intrudes-"young," "middle-age," and "old" are all vague appellations. There is little clarity as to criteria for identifying those
common elements which combine, in the first instance, to signify the
group's very existence, save for the fact of age alone. 190 Indeed, some
have urged that we must start redefining the middle-aged and the elderly-there are the "young old," aged 55 to 74, and the "old-old," aged
75 and over. 19 1 Thus, for a court to announce that a given age group is
suspect is to ask it first to identify a group whose very contours are
unclear. Granted, this need not always be a major problem; undoubtedly we can all agree that certain groupings are obvious. Those over
80, say, are unquestionably old; those under 15 are unquestionably
young; those aged 13 or so to 19 or so are adolescents. But at the edges
the matter of definition, and consequent exclusion or inclusion in the
group, is a complicated one: is a 65-year-old man "old," or is he in late
middle age? No certain answer ensues, and the problem is compounded further by changing social realities. In 1890, for example, almost seventy percent of all men over age 65 worked; 192 apparently they
were not old in the sense of employability, at least. But today, the per93
centage of employed older workers is far, far less-twenty percent.
Given this statistic, superannuation apparently arises at a relatively
early age. On the other hand, a 65-year-old white male today has a
statistically predicted future life span of 13.9 years. 94 On that basis,
perhaps he should not be deemed old.
A second problem lies in the fact that age distinctions do serve
some socially beneficial functions. They make life easier for government bureaucrats; they save the costs which would be incurred by individualized treatment; they even may avert injustices which might arise
through abuses of discretion were a system of individualized treatment
to supplant our age-geared society. Granted, the valuing of these benefits will be a function of perceived evil: certainly, were like justifica190. One authority, pointing to such factors as subjection to discrimination, high visibility,
and their functioning as a subgroup, has concluded that "[iln many respects the aged show characteristics of a minority group." Breen, TheAging Individual, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERONTOL-

oGY 145, 157 (C. Tibbitts ed. 1960). Another expert disagrees: "From the standpoint of
conceptual clarity and empirical fact, the notion of the aged as a minority group does not increase
understanding. It obscures it." Streib, Are the Aged a Minority Group?, in MIDDLE AGE AND
AGING 35, 46 (B. Neugarten ed. 1968).
191. See, e.g., Policyfor the 1980s, supra note 139, at 48-50. See also Townsend, The Emergence ofthe Four-GenerationFamily in Industrial Society, in MIDDLE AGE AND AGING 255, 256

(B. Neugarten ed. 1968).
192. CRITERIA FOR RETIREMENT 12-13 (G. Mathiasen ed. 1953).

193. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, PART I-DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1979, S.
No. 96-613, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. xlvi (1980). The figure for women is 8.3%. Id.
194. Id. at xxviii.
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tions to be offered for using gender distinctions, they would be rejected,
given that the courts are persuaded that gender discrimination is too
invidious to be tolerated in the name of bureaucratic expediency. 9 5 In
other words, these "benefits" of age lines are at least in part perceived
as benefits because the evil they perpetrate is not perceived as invidious.
A third, related problem arises out of the fact that age distinctions
serve a multiplicity of purposes, and arise in a multiplicity of settings.
In the employment arena, for example, mandatory retirement may be
justified as a means to rid the workplace of deadwood; to reduce the
costs which would otherwise accrue from an individualized testing approach to firing; to protect the feelings of superannuated employees
who actually are declining, but would rather have an impersonal system of ouster remove them than submit to the degrading experience of
being told they are lapsing into inability; and to make room for
younger employees. Age restrictions are imposed upon the franchise
ostensibly to assure competency by those voting. Exclusion from juries
apparently is premised on the same goal. Curfews imposed on youngsters are bottomed on concerns for their safety. 196 Driver licensure limits emanate from concerns both about the driver's safety and that of the
public.' 97 Given these disparate aims, all served ostensibly by age restrictions, the courts necessarily may find themselves-were they to
venture into the thicket--called upon to make judgments whose difficulties they would just as soon forego.
Still another difficulty lies in the fact that no particular age line is
likely to be better than another. Assuming a court were disposed to
find constitutional fault with a given age distinction, yet at the same
time the court were willing to tolerate some age cutoff, it would have no
readily obvious means to serve both ends. For example, if one accepts
the notion that some age minimum is acceptable for eligibility for licensure to drive, one is hard pressed to establish that age 16 is inappropriate, whereas age 15 or 14 or whatever is not. Thus, unless a court is
prepared to abolish the age limitation entirely, it will find itself in difficult straits. Of course, this problem would become particularly acute
were a court to hold that age is a suspect classification. It is unlikely
that a state could ever justify the particular age line drawn as being
195. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (sex discrimination).
196. See generally Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinancesand the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REv.
109 (1977).
197. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 512, 153 A. 457, 464 (1931); Berberian v. Petit,
181 R.I. 448, 455, 374 A.2d 791, 795 (1977).
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necessary to achieve whatever compelling interest it was that it sought
to serve.'

98

Finally, there is the risk that an unrefined condemnation of ageism
will accomplish too much. One can insist that age discrimination visited upon adults is generally bad and yet accept differential treatment
of youngsters. But an undifferentiated judicial posture, subjecting all
age distinctions to rigorous examination, may wind up undermining
those laws and practices which embody this felt distinction between
adults and non-adults. Moreover, those who suffer from discrimination-particularly seniors and children-also benefit from it; yet rejection of the bad may necessitate loss of benefits as well.
Given these complexities, even the court concerned about the unfairness which age discrimination may impose in a given case likely
will take the course of simply assessing the challenged law or regulation under the minimum rationality test. The test is tantamount to judicial abdication in most instances, of course, but it is at least a device
which relieves the courts of resolving what may be unsolvable
problems and which enables them to avoid a variety of undesirable
ramifications.
Having said all that, there is still a nagging argument to be made
that age discrimination is not innocuous, that it does defy basic notions
of equality and justice by imposing treatment based on a characteristic
which is immutable at any given point in time and over which the individual has no control. One can reject equating ageism with racism and
sexism, yet still conclude that age discrimination is a practice to be
avoided when possible. The task is to determine whether, if this sense
of injustice has any persuasiveness, there is some means to enable the
courts to be more sensitive, without engaging them in all the difficulties
which may lie in wait.
Unfortunately, the choices are limited, and even no tentative solution is entirely palatable. One could succumb to the temptation of contending that all age classifications should be suspect. This is an
unwinnable tack, of course, given Murgia. Moreover, it is one which
likely should be unwinnable. Ageism simply is not as pernicious as is
racism. Granted, this is a judgmental assertion. Some may disagree.
But, if a history of degradation, and the elements of isolation, stigma
198. Justice Stewart, concurring and dissenting in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
observed: -[T]o test the power to establish an age qualification by the 'compelling interest' standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a 'compelling
interest' in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather than another." Id at 294
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and powerlessness have significance in identifying those most in need
of judicial interventionism-and they do-most age categorizations
simply miss the mark.
Moreover, the costs of declaring age to be a suspect classificationeven assuming one could define which age group one was talking about
with sufficient definitiveness-would be too great. Virtually no law can
withstand the scrutiny of the compelling interest test; certainly that is so
in the case of age distinctions. How, for example, could a government
agency ever establish to the satisfaction of this legal test that age 65 is
constitutionally acceptable as the standard eligibility age for Social Security, or that age 5 is the proper age for allowing enrollment in grammar school, or that age 70 is the right line to draw for imposed
retirement? Even if one were to assume that the agency could establish
a compelling interest for having some eligibility or exclusionary standard, it could never establish that the particular age used was necessary
to achieving that interest, as opposed to age 63 or 67 for Social Security, or age 4 or 6 for kindergarten.
Some might say that the consequent collapse of age-based laws
would be all to the good-be done with age distinctions once and for
all. The problem would be that enormous social and economic costs
would ensue. Assuming that the purpose of Social Security is to help
replace retirees' lost work income, one would have to devise an individualized test to assess need, administer it and provide for administrative
appeals of adverse determinations, if the use of the simple criterion of
age were to be abolished. The same administrative complexities would
ensue in a variety of settings--driver licensure, voting, curfews and so
on. The task of devising adequate tests would be onerous at best; the
expense would be staggering; the wait for final decisions inordinate.
Injustices would still occur, given the opportunities for bureaucratic
mistakes and outright abuse.
A second choice is the minimum rationality test-the approach
prescribed by Murgia and Vance, and that which is employed throughout equal protection case law whenever age distinctions are relied
upon. In almost every instance, the age line at issue will survive. Thus,
this standard is a prescription for maintaining the status quo, and for
not responding to the unfairness inherent in ageism. Because it is too
insensitive to the vices of ageism, this standard-at least if used indifferently in all instances-is inadequate.
A third option would be to utilize a mechanism of analysis less
rigorous than the compelling interest test, yet not as lenient as the mini-
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mum rationality standard. Justice Marshall, for example, proposed a
three-part inquiry in Aurgia, looking to "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
receive, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification." 199
Justice Marshall's approach undoubtedly reflects a greater sensitivity to the potential abuses of age distinctions than does the minimum
rationality test. That is praiseworthy. Whether in the judicial forum it
is particularly workable is a different matter. Social Security provides a
good testing ground. Under Justice Marshall's formula, one could first
readily conclude that the importance of receiving financial benefits is
certainly an important individual interest. On the other hand, the state
interests in ensuring the financial stability of the system, as well as in
avoiding the considerable costs which would be associated with a test
measuring a given individual's need for benefits to replace lost work
income-presumably the only adequate alternative to the age criterion-would make the state's case for continuing reliance upon the age
line a very strong one. One is left with the unguided task, then, of
choosing as to which interest is more persuasive. Here, the test breaks
down; it offers little guidance, after all.
Given the foregoing standard approaches to constitutional interpretation, it may well be wise to conclude that the courts and the Constitution are just not equipped to deal with age distinctions. This need
not devastate opponents of ageism, of course. There is, after all, still
the option to seek redress and to prevent wrong in the legislative forum.
It may be too late in the day to dispense with age as the criterion for
eligibility in the Social Security system, but that does not mean that
legislators cannot be sensitized to the sometime problems of ageism,
and be urged to use age lines carefully and thoughtfully in drafting new
laws and revising old ones.

A

REFINED ASSESSMENT OF AGEISM

Perhaps, however, total surrender to the notion that the courts
should play no role under the Constitution is not called for. There are
some guidelines which are justified by the peculiar nature of age classifications and which, if carefully utilized, can avert, in some settings at
least, the traps and ambiguities of an unrefined, generalized condemnation of age distinctions.
199. 427 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The first postulate is that unadorned age distinctions have no redeeming merit. There is enough risk of unfair treatment following
from the use of age differentiations embedded in statutes and regulations to warrant the conclusion that an age distinction is irrational if it
serves no purpose other than as an arbitrary expression of a legislature's desire to use age lines. Thus, the age distinction must have some
other basis apart from simply serving as a demarcation to separate the
eligible from the ineligible. Accordingly, age 16 as the signal event for
driver licensure eligibility must (and does) serve some substantive end,
such as separating the potentially dangerous drivers from the (hopefully) safe ones. Age 65 in the Social Security setting must be justified,
as it can be, by pointing to the need to approximate-admittedly in a
very inexact manner--that point in time when physical decline is likely
to warrant relieving workers from their previous toils, or that point
when society is willing to encourage older people to make room for
younger workers by making elders' departures from the work force
financially feasible.
A second postulate is that it is the user of the age line which should
bear the burden of justification. Obviously, in most instances the age
line in question still will survive. But at least it will be the user of the
age line which will have the task of disclosing its purpose, thereby unveiling purely arbitrary age distinctions laid down for no other purpose
than that of making such distinctions. There is nothing novel, of
course, about this prescription. The Supreme Court has hinted at it by
sometimes asserting, albeit with no consistency, that even under the
rationality approach the burden rests with the defender of the challenged law to articulate a justification for it.2°° Similarly, commentators have urged this course.20 ' What is new here is the assertion that
age-based classifications should always be deemed to raise enough of a
problem, even in the abstract and without looking to particularly odious examples of discrimination, so as to warrant this much more than
standard mere rationality discourse. For not even asking that much,
the Murgia and Vance Courts were, at the outset and independent of
20 2
any more specific defects in the decisions, simply too lax.
Third, ageism should, and properly can, be acknowledged as a
phenomenon whose invidiousness varies with the setting. All race dis200. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
201. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 63, at 20-24.
202. Actually, in Murgia the Court did perhaps opt for this course. See 427 U.S. at 313-14.
The subsequent Vance Court, however, clearly rejected it. See notes 123-25 and accompanying
text szpra.
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crimination is bad, and evokes the compelling interest test; all gender
discrimination is sufficiently dubious that it warrants the intermediate
test which demands a showing of an important governmental interest
and that the law used to achieve that interest is substantially related to
the interest.20 3 All age distinctions, on the other hand, do not constitute
condemnable discrimination. More particularly, such distinctions
which distinguish those deemed too young are tolerable and acceptable. There are two reasons for this perception. First, age, notwithstanding its permanence on any given day of a person's life,
nonetheless is over time a constantly changing quality. The pertinence
of this is particularly apt as to children, because the unfairness of deprivation imposed because of an immutable characteristic is tempered by
the fact that youngsters will outgrow their age-based disabilities. Indeed, as to any limitation imposed for being too young, whether the
target of that limitation is a child or a young adult or a 55-year-old, this
holds true. In contrast, race and gender are unchanging. Second, race
and gender are characteristics which are irrelevant insofar as issues of
competency, judgmental capacity, physical ability and emotional and
psychological maturity are concerned. Lack of age can bear relevance
to these qualities: the use of age as a basis for treating minors differently than adults is grounded in reality and that reality is not one
shaped, in the main, by unfounded biases or thoughtless traditions.
Granting the variability in seriousness of age distinctions, there
still are times when ageism's bite is particularly pernicious, and cannot
be countenanced. The fourth postulate, then, is that when age is used
as a basis for depriving a person of a right which is secured under the
Constitution and which, but for his age, he could successfully claim, the
standard of scrutiny which that right ordinarily evokes should apply to
the age distinction now tied up with that right.2°4 For example, the
Court has held that limitations on the ability of a woman to obtain an
20 5
abortion elicit strict judicial scrutiny under the due process clause.
Accordingly, restrictions imposed on minors who seek abortions-such
as the requirement of parental consent-likewise should be examined
under this standard. 2°6 If there is no compelling interest for treating
youngsters differently than adult women, the law should fall. In many
instances, of course, the state will be able to come forth with a compel203. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
204. See Tribe, Childhood,Suspect Class#Fcations,and Conclusive Presumptions. Three Linked
Riddles, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 8, 11-12 (1975).

205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
206. In fact, they have not been. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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ling interest-protection of the child and of family interests. The difficult task will be that of establishing that the use of any particular age
line to distinguish between those who must secure parental consent and
those who must not is necessary to achieving that interest. Likely, the
state could not succeed: there is no good reason for setting age 15 as
the critical point of demarcation rather than 14 or 16. Because of this,
but more importantly because of the fact that age distinctions imposed
upon children are generally more tolerable, the state should not be held
to a necessity standard vis-a-vis the specific age lines employed. It
should be sufficient that the state demonstrate that some fencing out or
fencing off of juveniles is necessary to achieve its interest, without it
having to further establish that the exact age demarcation used is also
necessary. There is no warrant, however, for relaxing the necessity element entirely insofar as adults are concerned, as discussed below.
Thus, if the rationality test would normally apply absent the age factor,
it would apply here also, except that it would be modified so as to require that the proponent of the law bears the burden of justification. If
the compelling interest test would normally apply, absent the age factor, so too would it apply here, with the one caveat that where the compelling interest standard is elicited, the state need not establish that the
specific age line used is necessary to achieving that interest when nonadults are the grievants.
The fifth postulate focuses mainly on adults. It has already been
suggested that age distinctions for the sake of age distinctions and nothing more should be deemed irrational; it has further been suggested
that as to any age distinction the burden should be on its user to justify
it. Over and above these initial predicates, it should be recognized that
age distinctions which penalize someone for being too old are more
invidious, and thus should elicit more stringent judicial scrutiny, than
those which penalize for being too young. This postulate should apply
whether it is a constitutional right which is being manipulated on the
basis of age, or a claim short of that. Obviously, given the prior discussion, impairment of a constitutional right which would ordinarily
evoke the compelling interest test should likewise do so in this context.
However, rather than the necessity prong of that test being relaxed
when an age distinction bars those too old, the state indeed should have
to show that its age line is necessary. And even in settings where the
compelling interest test would not apply, the mere rationality standard
should not suffice--the first two postulates make that clear already.
Rather, in such context, the user of the age line should be held to the
test of establishing an important government interest, and further es-
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tablishing that the means used--e.-, the age distinction-are substantially related to that end.
The test proposed is that which the Court has devised for examining gender discrimination. 207 Given the foregoing discussion, it may be
legitimately asked why, if age discrimination generally is not
equivalent to gender discrimination, the standard set forth for the latter
is properly applicable to the former. The answer turns on the element
of permanency: when an age line is used as a criterion for imposing a
burden or denying a benefit because one is too old, that distinction is
one which indeed is, like gender (and race for that matter), immutable.
There is no way for an individual to become younger. Thus, a statute
which bars the hiring of individuals over 35 as fire fighters, or a law
which ousts workers at age 70, is one whose onus can never be escaped.
It is because of this finality that the tougher test set forth in the gender
cases aptly applies here.
Granted, this logic has its flaws. The 14-year-old who desperately
wants to drive but who is denied licensure until he is 16 is subjected to
a discrimination which cannot, through anything within his control, be
overcome. For him, on any given day, his age on that day is immutable, too. The savings, however, is that at least he will outgrow his disability. The 35-year-old applicant for the fire fighter's job, or the 70year-old workman still wanting to work, will not.
Obviously, immutability is posited here as a critical factor in the
equation which leads to enhanced judicial scrutiny of laws and regulations which exclude or deprive because of the individual being deemed
too old. Yet an argument based on the immutability criterion alone is
one whose logic may go too far. We are all possessed of a number of
immutable characteristics: height, eye color, general facial structure
and intelligence are attributes over which, to varying degrees, the individual has little, perhaps even no, control. If immutability were to be
the sole and sufficient basis for enhanced concern under the Constitution, presumably laws keyed to any one of these characteristics would
evoke special judicial solicitude-an eventuality both dubious on its
own merits, and certainly unlikely to be accepted by the courts, in any
event.
Laws which exclude or deprive for being too old, however, typically carry with them at least two special aspects which separate them
from those which classify on the basis of eye color, intelligence or the
like. The first of these is the matter of stigma. Group, or individual,
207. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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denigration has consistently been one of those factors which has
loomed significant in the Court's assessment of the invidiousness of
classifications. In Brown v. Board of Education,20 8 for example, in
which the Court struck down the separate-but-equal doctrine, the
Court reasoned that "[t]o separate [children] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 20 9 Similarly,
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and three other Justices in University of CaliforniaBoardof Regents v. Bakke, 210 reasoned that the white
plaintiff's claim of unconstitutional exclusion from the medical school
to which he had applied and which utilized a preferential admissions
system for minorities should fail because the racial classification at issue-a classification which only disadvantaged whites--did not pro2 11
duce stigmatization.
Ours is a society in which being labeled elderly is stigmatizing. It
is a commonplace to observe that we live in a "youth culture," where
the young are glorified and old age is ignored, suppressed or derided.
The evidence is abundant. In common parlance, "old" is used as an
epithet: someone who is young and acts offensively may be called a
"son of a bitch," but no reference is made to his age; someone who is
old and acts in like manner is an "old fart" or an "old bastard." The
young adult who acts silly may be chided; the older person who acts
frivolously is an "old fool." Stereotypes about competency are encapsulated in the saw about an old dog being unable to learn new tricks.
Colloquialisms suggesting the negative nature of old age are common. 2 12 In brief, old is undesirable.
There is even some stigma which often attaches when we say that a
40-year-old is too old to play baseball, or a 36-year-old is too old to be
hired as a fire fighter, or a 30-year-old is too old to work as a lingerie
model. In each setting, there is the inference that the person is not as
good as he or she used to be; that the individual once was up to par,
2
was at peak performance or appearance level, and now no longer is.13
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
209. Id at 494.
210. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
211. Id at 373-76.

212. "Our colloquialisms reveal a great deal: once you are old you are 'fading fast,' 'over the
hill,' 'out to pasture,' 'down the drain,' 'finished,' 'out of date,' an 'old crock,' 'fogy,' 'geezer' or
'biddy."' R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 1-2 (1975).

213. Obviously, the stigmatization theme does not always aptly apply to sustain the argument
that being deemed too old is a stigmatizing experience. In Blue v. University Interscholastic
League, 503 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Tex. 1980), for example, 19-year-olds were excluded from high
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Thus, the immutable factor of being too old is translated into a
basis for stigmatization-a translation far less common with regard to
characteristics such as eye color or height or length of ear lobes or a
variety of other physical characteristics. 21 4 And stigmatization is a crucial factor in constitutionally based assessment of classifications.
The second element in this analysis looks to the characteristic of
being too old and its relationship to the ability to perform or contribute
to society. This factor was addressed, albeit without significant exposition, by the four-judge plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson2 5 who
joined to argue that gender is a suspect classification-a conclusion
which failed to capture a majority there, and which has not prevailed
since. In urging that position, Justice Brennan, writing for the foursome, urged that immutability was one of the key factors warranting
special judicial concern regarding legislation based on gender classifications. At the same time, he sought to cabin the thrust of his argument by drawing a distinction between gender and other immutable
characteristics:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status2 16without
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
On the merits, Justice Brennan's assertion is troubling. With atypical insensitivity, and without support in either scientific or social science data, he simply tossed outside the pale of judicial concern millions
of individuals who are mentally and physically disabled. He succumbed to stereotypes, without any examination of them: those who
are of lesser intelligence, or who are in some manner physically impaired, were thoughtlessly accepted as not being able to perform or
contribute to society to the same degree as are the "normal." The point
school football competition because it was thought they would be too skilled for younger players
to contend with.

214. Undoubtedly there are some immutable characteristics which are used as a basis for stigmatization. Stupidity is not generally an attribute to which one aspires; being labeled "dumb" is
certainly denigrating. Lack of pleasing physical appearance can also generate negative reactions
by observers. These realities do not, however, undercut the fact that being denominated too old is
also stigmatizing. To the contrary, they encourage giving greater consideration to whether the
courts have been insufficiently sensitive in these areas as well. Justice Brennan sought to deal with
the intelligence characteristic in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See text accompanYing note 216 infra. Whether he did so successfully is debatable. See text following note 216
215. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
216. Id at 686-87.
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here, however, is not to assess the unprotected status of the dull or
handicapped. As a formulation endorsed by four Justices, this rationale has relevance to treating with special scrutiny laws and regulations
which deprive those deemed too old. That relevance follows from the
fact that, whatever the problematic nature of his assertion, certainly the
formulation offered by Justice Brennan, if accorded some credence,
sustains the argument that deprivation based on being too old cannot
cavalierly be condoned. For it is rare that the characteristic of too
many years will bear a relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society. In many instances, that conclusion can be empirically supported. Indeed, in Murgia, for example, the Court readily acknowl21 7
edged that the plaintiff himself was fully qualified to perform his job.
Numerous studies about the performance abilities of older persons sustain that assessment in other settings. 218 And, of course, laws excluding
those too old will not necessarily just be limited to mandatory retirement contexts. Some laws, for example, bar the hiring of fire fighters or
police officers who are over a certain age, such as 29 or 35.219 Federally
funded research programs may exclude researchers over a certain age,
say 30 or 40; federal grants may likewise bar all save the young. It
would be difficult to seriously contend that such exclusionary age-based
restrictions actually reflect the individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. At most, they reflect some judgment about the relevance of age to a particular activity-a judgment which, given the
hardship imposed, should be put to a more rigorous test than mere rationality.
Given the typically inexact congruity, then, between the immutable factor used as the basis for classification----e., being too old-and
its relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society, Justice
Brennan's formulation, applied in the age context, further militates in
220
favor of special judicial solicitude.
217. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311 (1976).
218. See notes 142-43 supra.
219. See, e.g., McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
24, § 10-2.1-14 (1979).
220. What makes generalizations based on being too old further inappropriate, particularly as
contrasted with barriers erected for those too young, is the presence of a useable track record
which can readily be substituted in most instances for generalization. Presumably, for example,
state police officers are retired at age 50 in Massachusetts because on the basis of experience it can
be established that there is some sort of gradual decline which is perceptible and measurable.
Legislators or administrators thus have an information base on which to ground their age exclusion. Where that base is persuasive, the exclusion perhaps can stand; where it is not, the exclusion
should not continue. In contrast, exclusions for being too young are, in the nature of things,
unsupportable by such an experiential predicate. We engage in the statutory assumption that
generally teenagers under age 16 are too young to drive; we cannot verify that with a large body of
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How, then, would these five postulates work in context? One can
take age restrictions on the franchise as a testing ground. Persons
under the age of 18 are denied the vote-something which they have
never had in the first instance. Presumably, the age demarcation is imposed for some reason other than just the whimsical desire to use age
distinctions; it likely would be justified by the state as serving to assure
competency in the voting booth. While there is no right to voteper se,
there is a right to equality of access to the franchise, and thus the strict
judicial scrutiny test should apply in examining this justification to determine whether there is a compelling interest. Presumably, the state
can demonstrate a compelling interest in assuring the competency of
voters and in assuring that those who vote are not too susceptible to the
emotional, financial and other influences of other individuals, e.g., parents. That should be sufficient; the state need not show that age 18 is
the necessary means to achieve that interest.
As for age restrictions on candidacy, there is no constitutional
right to run for, or hold, political office. There is, however, a fundamental interest possessed by voters-again in the pursuit of their claim
to equality of treatment in the franchise-to be able to have their candidates on the ballot without undue barriers. Here it may well be,
given again the application of the compelling interest element, that a
law which bars over-age candidates may fail, for the state should be
hard pressed to establish that it has a compelling interest in assuring
that voters only have so-called competent candidates for whom they
may vote. Indeed, there is a powerful argument to be made that the
state has no business filtering out from the political processes those
whom it does not think will do a good job. That is a determination best
left to those entering the voting booth. Certainly, in any event, the particular maximum age lines chosen could not survive as being necessary
to achieving the state's interest.
Mandatory retirement can also be scrutinized under this formula.
data, since we have not undertaken to see whether indeed the assumption is true by allowing a
large test group of under-16-year-olds to drive.
Thus, there is less warrant for holding the legislator or administrator accountable, since he
cannot be charged with ignoring, or relying upon, experience as the basis for his decision. Of
course, there is something of a catch-22 situation here; the exclusion of those too young is supportable because there is no contrary experience warranting striking down the exclusion, and the reason there is no contrary experience is because of the existence of the exclusion in the first instance.
Even granting that, the important point is that the predicates for exclusions based on the individual being too old can be readily verified in most instances, simply because we will typically have a
comparison group of those who are approaching and just below the critical age whose performance or suitability can be judged in the flesh, so to speak. Thus, judicial deference to legislative
judgments need not be readily accepted as a posture necessitated by the difficulties of making
thoughtful assessments of age distinctions which have an impact on those too old.
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There is no right to government employment, the Murgia Court has
held. Thus, it would be the intermediate, gender discrimination-derived test which would apply to measure the constitutionality of a law
forcing ouster at a given age-such as 70. Sometimes the government
entity might be able to show an important interest-making room for
the young, assuring the competency of the work force or some other
justification. Assuming it could do so (and this assumption is qualified
by the further assumption that sometimes the agency will in fact fail at
this first stage), the next task will be for the agency to establish that use
of age 70 is substantially related to achieving that end. This will require the agency to come forward with data to show, in the context of
the making-room-for-the-young justification, for example, that indeed
ouster at 70 has a substantial relationship to that end. Are there, for
example, data showing that the removal of Mr. X will lead to the promotion of a younger man who would not, but for Mr. X's removal, be
otherwise able to rise? Or, if the removal of incompetent employees is
the end sought, are there data showing that age correlates with ability
and, more particularly, that age 70 correlates with a discernible decline? In pursuit of this analysis, the defender of the policy will not,
however, have to show that its policy embodies the least restrictive alternative, an aspect of the compelling interest test. Thus, it will be able
to prevail if it adduces significant data of the nature noted, without
having to further show that individualized testing is impossible.
Had the Murgia Court employed this analysis, it might well be
that Officer Murgia still would have lost, given the rigors of the job and
the data adduced in the trial court showing a rise in cardiovascular
problems with age. 221 But given this test, employees in less rigorous
occupations might well prevail, and thus one could get to more sensitive individualized treatment of people, rather than utilizing the mere
rationality approach which ousts the contemplative judge and the academician, along with the police officer and the fire fighter.
What of special benefits-programs and entitlements extended
typically to the young and the old? Insofar as a claim of discrimination
is made by one who is denied for being too young, the foregoing analysis seems to work without much problem. But benefits extended to the
young occasion some pause. Here, the argument would go, there is
discrimination for being too old. A law which bars those over age 19
from a government subsidized medical screening program, for example, works adversely as to the interests of the 23-year-old. Under the
221. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 311 (1976).
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foregoing formulation such a law would evoke the intermediate level of
scrutiny, and it just might happen that the government agency would
be unable to show an important justification for the law and/or that the
age 19 cutoff is substantially related to an important interest, if one is
established. The same fate could befall a law which limits an adult
education program to those under age 45 or a policy excluding those
over 19 from public high school enrollment. This is not, of course, to
say that such results are inevitable; 222 but they certainly are possible.
They are tolerable, as well. And they are so because, ultimately, deprivation imposed for being too old imposes a loss-in terms of justicewhich outweighs the added costs which expanded programs would require.
Do these five principles solve all problems? Clearly they do not.
But they do afford a means for courts to address ageism with some
greater sensitivity without-in a good many instances-having to get
caught up in the difficulties of assessing alternatives, without having to
make as many unguided choices between individual interests in individualized treatment and governmental interests in efficiency, and so
on. Permanency of deprivation is the key. It is the factor which separates, in the first instance, tolerable age distinctions from those which
warrant a suspicious examination. Permanency accommodates the distinction between adults and children, and permanency triggers recognition of the odiousness of condemnable distinctions made against adults
for being too old as opposed to distinctions made regarding adults not
yet old enough.
Ideally, of course, legislators should not stop where the Constitution halts. Courts may not be able to do more 'under the Constitution,
but lawmakers can become sensitive to all age distinctions, asking
whether as to the given issue before them there is some other alternative which more justly reflects the actual programmatic and legislative
goals being sought. 2 23 With subsidized public mass transit fares, for
example, the careful legislative draftsman could ask whether, if the basis for such a benefit is financial need, an arbitrary age line indeed
serves the purpose of selecting out those who are in need. If there is a
222. It may be possible to show, for example, that the diseases which the medical screening
program is designed to identify are limited to youngsters, and that the only reason those even as
old as 17, 18 and 19 are included is to catch the very rare aberrant case. It may be possible to
show, in the high school example, that the age exclusion is correlated with child labor laws; if
those over 19 can work in the same occupations as adults, there is then a substantial relation
between the age 19 limit and the interest in providing education to those otherwise barred from
equal opportunity (on the basis of age) in the job market.
9
223. See Policy for the 1 80s, supra note 127.
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better way, that way should be given serious consideration; the legislator can make the decision whether the public is prepared to bear the
costs of an individualized means test here. As sensitivity to ageism increases, perhaps there will be occasions, after all, when legislators will
be willing to have society absorb these costs, rather than relying upon
the unrefined standard of age. That would be all to the good.

